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Abstract:  
Recent instances of political backlash against global governance efforts as well as conventional 
wisdom suggest that there is a link between shifting authority from the domestic to the global level, 
on the one hand, and the legitimacy of global governance institutions as perceived by citizens and 
other stakeholders on the other. We thus investigate whether and how increasing the authority of a 
global governance institution affects citizens’ legitimacy perceptions, using a population-based 
survey experiment in Germany and the United States (N=1600 each). The empirical focus is on 
climate change, a costly and paradigmatic global governance effort. The results show that certain 
shifts of political authority, such as changes to majority decision making at the international level 
and automatic implementation of international decisions domestically, do not significantly affect 
“average” citizens’ legitimacy perceptions of global governance institutions. This result is not due to 
citizens’ incapacity to understand the implications of increasing authority, namely, that increasing 
authority results in a loss of control over climate policy in Germany and the United States. Rather, 
legitimacy perceptions appear to be shaped by citizens’ perceptions of procedural and performance 
quality of such efforts as well as by their level of cognitive mobilization, namely their interest in 
international politics. In brief, we find that citizens relate perceived procedural and performance 
quality of global governance with their evaluation of its legitimacy, but that subtle shifts of authority 
from the domestic to the global level do not per se affect citizens’ legitimacy perceptions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Many observers of international politics link the authority of a global governance institution 
with its legitimacy as perceived by citizens and other stakeholders. In constructing this link, they 
usually surmise that as the authority of a global governance institution increases, perceptions of its 
legitimacy decline unless the institution continues to meet citizens’ and stakeholders’ procedural and 
performance standards (Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Erdhardt Zürn 2012; 2015; Tallberg and Zürn (this 
volume). A contemporary example of this hypothesized link is Brexit, where in June 2016, 52 
percent of Britons voted to leave the EU. One common post hoc explanation of this event is that 
Brexit was catalyzed by the mounting frustration of Britons with Brussels’ influence over British 
politics and law, particularly in regards to immigration policy and its perceived impact on the British 
economy. Despite the ubiquity of this authority-legitimacy argument, it remains open to debate 
whether the loss of the EU’s legitimacy amongst Britons in fact occurred as a direct result of the 
EU’s increasing authority, or because of other factors, such as elite cues. In this paper, we delve 
deeper into this presumed link between the authority of a global governance institution and its 
legitimacy in order to better understand the formation of citizens’ legitimacy perceptions of such 
institutions. By global governance institution, we mean a formal, multilateral and organizational or 
administrative arrangement, such as an international organization, as well as private, bilateral or 
informal pacts. We investigate to what extent and how the authority of global governance institutions 
affects citizens’ legitimacy perceptions if at all.   
The existing literature offers limited insights into the link between the authority of global 
governance institutions and citizens’ legitimacy perceptions concerning such institutions. Prior work 
on the formation of citizens’ legitimacy perceptions tends to measure concepts related to legitimacy 
such as citizens’ support, confidence or trust, but not legitimacy directly (Gibson and Caldeira 1995; 
Norris 2000; Hessami 2011; Voeten 2013; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015). In addition, previous 
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research on the effects of authority on citizens’ legitimacy perceptions uses observational study 
designs, making it challenging to parse out causal effects of authority on legitimacy perceptions from 
other factors, such as heuristics (Della Porta et al. 2006; Levi and Murphy 2006; Dellmuth and 
Tallberg this volume; Dingwerth, Schmidtke, and Weise this volume). As a result, it remains open 
whether citizens even understand the implications of transferring authority to a global governance 
institution and if such transfer, in turn, affect their legitimacy perceptions.  
We contribute to this literature in at least three ways. First, we seek to disentangle competing 
theories on the formation of citizens’ legitimacy perceptions. The most prominent theory, in contrast 
to the “link” hypothesis, is that ordinary citizens have underdeveloped attitudes towards global 
governance institutions because they are either incapable or uninterested in evaluating the 
institutions’ authority. Instead, citizens use heuristics, such as communication from domestic and 
international elites, to develop their legitimacy perceptions, often bypassing fact-based evaluations of 
an institution’s authority (Dellmuth and Tallberg, this volume). Our experimental study thus assesses 
whether increasing the authority of an institution has any direct effects on citizens’ legitimacy 
perceptions. We also look into whether citizens understand the implications of varying levels of 
authority, and how they form their legitimacy perceptions under these conditions. We thus seek to 
assess the empirical relevance of two competing explanations of citizens’ legitimacy belief 
formation: (1) that citizens are in fact ignorant and incapable of assessing the authority of global 
governance institutions; or (2) that shifts of authority actually do or do not influence individuals’ 
legitimacy perceptions directly.  
Second, our study sheds light on potential differences in the authority-legitimacy link as 
formed by different types of citizens. Since individual-level characteristics are likely to matter for 
citizens’ legitimacy perceptions (see Hooghe and Marks 2005; Edwards 2009; Hooghe and Marks 
2009; Johnson 2011; Ecker-Erhardt 2012; Voeten 2013; Chalmers and Dellmuth 2015; Dellmuth and 
Tallberg 2015; Schlipphak 2015), the effect of authority on legitimacy perceptions should also vary 
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by individuals’ characteristics (Zürn and Tallberg, this volume). Building on the aforementioned 
“incapable citizens” argument, we theorize that the authority of a global governance institution 
should affect citizens’ legitimacy perceptions more directly and to a larger extent if citizens are more 
cognitively mobilized (i.e. those more interested in international politics).  
Our third contribution to the existing literature is that we examine the authority-legitimacy 
link based on an experimental, rather than an observational study design. It is widely argued that 
many legitimation efforts by international organizations are necessary precisely because of their 
increasing authority (which supposedly diminishes perceived legitimacy amongst citizens). To assess 
the presumed causality between authority and legitimacy, an experimental approach with 
interventions associated with varying level of authority (see Section 3.1) is useful. Building on the 
typology by Hooghe and Marks (2015), we conceptualize authority on two dimensions: voting rules 
in international negotiations to create a climate change agreement (consensus or majority voting), 
and the domestic implementation procedures (automatic implementation at the domestic level or 
implementation after ratification by the national legislature). This results in four stylized climate 
governance frameworks (2x2 design) with differing levels of authority, which are randomly assigned 
to study participants. The dependent variable captures perceived legitimacy of the climate 
governance framework, a paradigmatic global governance effort that possesses relatively little 
authority at present. Our experiment was embedded in a survey with nationally representative 
samples from Germany and the United States (N=1600 each).  
The results show that even important shifts of authority, such as majority decision making at the 
international level and automatic implementation of international decisions domestically, do not 
significantly and directly affect citizens’ legitimacy perceptions on average.  They also show that this 
insignificant effect is not due to citizens’ inability to assess the authority of the climate governance 
framework. In fact, citizens clearly understand the implications of increased authority; namely, that it 
results in a loss of national control over climate policy. However, we find that amongst cognitively 
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mobilized individuals (i.e. those who are more interested in international politics and hence are more 
likely to be sensitive to nuanced institutional differences), increased authority increases perceived 
legitimacy. We also find that legitimacy perceptions are significantly correlated with citizens’ 
assessments of procedural and performance quality, though our experimental manipulations of 
authority do not significantly affect citizens’ perceptions of performance and procedural quality. This 
finding may at least partially explain why variation in authority has no direct effect on citizens’ 
legitimacy perceptions. If increased authority had affected perceptions of procedural and 
performance quality, then we could have observed a corresponding effect on citizens’ legitimacy 
perceptions. Our results hold when measuring perceived legitimacy in different ways, and when 
reducing the sample to participants who answered comprehension questions correctly and thus 
clearly understood the treatments.  
Our results have interesting implications for the climate governance framework and global 
governance institutions more broadly. They suggest that there is greater leeway than commonly 
assumed for shifting authority to global governance institutions without risk of domestic public 
backlash. They also suggest that legitimation efforts by international organization are necessary 
particularly with respect to citizens who are less familiar with and less interested in international 
politics.  
In the next section, we elaborate on the authority-legitimacy link. We then describe the study 
design, followed by the empirical findings, and a discussion and conclusion section.  
 
2. The Authority-Legitimacy Link from a Public Opinion Perspective 
Many authors note that global governance institutions have been acquiring more and more 
authority over the past decades (Blake and Payton 2015, Hooghe and Marks 2015; Zürn 2015). This 
means that authority originally located within countries is being pooled internationally and delegated 
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by states to such institutions (Hooghe and Marks 2015). Delegation, in this context, refers to states 
transferring agenda setting, decision-making, and implementation authority to global governance 
institutions, while pooling refers to changes in voting rules, such as shifting from consensus to 
majority voting in global governance institutions or reducing domestic implementation hurdles for 
international agreements (Hooghe and Marks 2015).  
Increases in the authority of global governance institutions have gone hand in hand with 
mounting concerns from observers and academics over the legitimacy of these institutions (Koppell 
2008; Li 2003; Wolf 2007). We define legitimacy as the belief by constituents and observers that the 
authority of a global governance institution is being appropriately exercised and thus meets their 
procedural and performance standards (Gibson and Caldeira 1995; Bodansky 1999; Bernstein 2011; 
Bernauer and Gampfer 2013; Voeten 2013; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015). One frequent criticism of 
the increasing authority of global governance institutions concerns procedural shortcomings, namely, 
the “democratic deficit” in terms of limited or deficient participation, accountability, and 
representation (Grant and Keohane 2005; Hobolt 2012; Keohane and Nye 2003; Anderson and 
Slaughter 2005; Wilkinson and Hughes 2002). Other observers have criticized the performance of 
such institutions, for example, their failure to deliver effective solutions or distributional fairness. 
What remains unclear is to what extent citizens’ legitimacy perceptions are affected by these shifts of 
authority. 
Existing work on the link between authority and citizens’ legitimacy perceptions uses 
observational data, often in aggregated form, which makes it difficult to assess whether authority 
affects legitimacy perceptions or citizens simply rely on elite cues (see Gabel and Scheve 2007; 
Dellmuth and Tallber this volume) or other heuristics to inform their legitimacy perceptions. 
Examples include the European Union (see Hooghe and Marks 2005; McLaren 2002), the World 
Trade Organization (Esty 2002), and the World Economic Forum (Della Porta et al. 2006; Levi and 
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Murphy 2006). For example, Hooghe and Marks (2009) note a shift in public attitudes from 
“permissive consensus” to a “constraining dissensus” towards the European Union as authority 
shifted from market integration to an increasingly complex system of governance dealing with a 
plethora of policy-areas. This is argued to have caused a loss of public trust and increased 
dissatisfaction with the European Union (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007; and Blondel et al. 1998). 
These results serve as a starting point. However, their empirical limitations preclude any definitive 
conclusions on how citizens link authority and legitimacy if at all. 
Dellmuth and Tallberg (this volume) among others argue that citizens lack the necessary time 
and capacity to understand the features and functions of global governance institutions, which limits 
their ability to draw conclusions regarding legitimacy.1  Many scholars in fact argue that citizens are 
rationally ignorant (Downs 1984) or even irrational with respect to politics (Caplan 2001; Lupia 
2015). They are apathetic to spending time and effort to acquire information about policy issues or 
participate actively in political decisions (Downs 1984). This may be particularly true if citizens 
perceive elites as acting in their best interest, or if policy issues are complex and hard to understand 
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002), which may be the case for various global governance issues 
(Gallup International 2005). Therefore, it is widely presumed that “ordinary” citizens form their 
opinions and legitimacy beliefs based on cues or frames they receive from elites and the media 
(Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Schlipphak 2015; Johnson 2011; Chong and Druckman 2007; 
Dellmuth and Tallberg this volume; Schneider, Schmidtke and Nullmeier this volume; Tallberg and 
Zürn this volume).  Based on this reasoning, we should not expect any direct effect of authority on 
citizens’ legitimacy perceptions. 
However, the absence of a direct effect of authority on legitimacy perceptions (which 
remains to be demonstrated empirically) may be difficult to interpret. Is it due to citizens’ ignorance 
                                                        
1 See Dellmuth and Tallberg this volume; Schmidtke this volume; and Tallberg and Zürn this volume. 
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with respect to global governance or their incapacity to evaluate the authority of these institutions? 
Or could it be that individuals are capable of assessing the authority-legitimacy link, as 
circumstantial evidence suggests (see Hooghe and Marks 2005), but that shifts of authority do in fact 
not affect their legitimacy perceptions? Our analysis will shed more light on this issue. If the former 
is true, that citizens truly cannot grasp global governance, then we should also expect insignificant 
relationships between: (1) perceived authority and actual authority, (2) perceived legitimacy and 
perceptions of procedural and performance quality, and (3) perceived authority and perceived 
legitimacy. That reason is that if citizens are ignorant or incapable of understanding global 
governance institutions, then they will randomly judge, guess, or apply a heuristic such as their trust 
or confidence in national institutions to form perceptions of global governance institutions’ 
procedural or performance quality as well as their authority. This will result in insignificant 
relationships. If the latter is true, meaning that citizens understand global governance, but shifts of 
authority still do not affect their legitimacy perceptions, then we should expect to find a significant 
and positive correlation between: (1) citizens’ perceived authority and the actual authority of a global 
governance institution, (2) a significant and positive correlation between citizens’ legitimacy 
perceptions and their perceptions of procedural and performance quality, and (3) a significant 
correlation between perceived authority and perceived legitimacy. This leads to the following main 
hypothesis: 
H1: Increases in authority of global governance institutions are unlikely to have a direct overall 
effect on citizens’ legitimacy perceptions.  
Though, as hypothesized, the overall direct effect is likely to be insignificant, particular types 
of citizens are perhaps more likely to link authority and legitimacy. Notably, even if the bulk of 
citizens were incapable of independently assessing the authority-legitimacy link, the need for cues by 
elites to that end is likely to decline as education, political astuteness, and interest of citizen increase 
(Inglehart 1970; Shively 1979). Access to information is likely to produce a qualitative change in the 
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political sophistication of citizenry (Inglehart 1977). Moreover, global governance institutions are 
increasingly engaged in campaigns aimed at promoting themselves to the general public and other 
stakeholders (Rauh and Zürn this volume; Tallberg and Zürn this volume). Because of this increased 
access to information and cognitive mobilization, more citizens can grasp the complexities of global 
governance and formulate their own legitimacy perceptions. In other words, citizens are likely to 
possess, to varying degrees, the skills and resources necessary to become politically engaged without 
dependence on external cues (Dalton 1984). Those who are highly mobilized are those who possess 
both the skills and motivation to grapple with the complexities of global governance on their own, 
and as a result, be able to evaluate the authority of a global governance institution.  Thus, we expect 
that:  
H2: Increases in authority of global governance institutions are more likely to affect the legitimacy 
perceptions of those who are cognitively mobilized.  
Similarly, we expect that those who are highly concerned and interested in the specific issue 
a global governance institution is dealing with will be more motivated to grapple with these 
complexities and understand the intricacies of global governance independently. As noted above, 
accessing information has become much easier in recent decades; thus we expect that such 
individuals will have the interest and desire to understand the authority and structure of the 
respective global governance institution. Therefore, we expect that: 
H3: Increases in authority of global governance institutions are more likely to affect the legitimacy 
perceptions of those who are highly interested or concerned about the issue the respective global 
governance institution is dealing with (in our case, this is climate change).  
Whether the link between authority and legitimacy is a tradeoff or mutually reinforcing 
amongst cognitively mobilized or highly concerned individuals remains open in the context of 
climate governance. We cannot see a compelling theoretical reason to expect a uniformly negative or 
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positive effect and suspect that the direction of the effect depends on the specific policy context. In 
climate policy, many observers have diagnosed rather low legitimacy, whereas pooling and 
delegation have been relatively weak for the time being (Vihma 2011). Many authors attribute this 
presumed legitimacy loss to poor performance of the climate governance framework in delivering 
effective solutions to the problem, whereas others have also criticized procedural aspects of the 
system (Falk and Strauss 2001; Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2005; Scholte 2007; Dimitrov 2010; 
Lidskog and Elander 2010; Doherty and Wolak 2012; Bernauer and Gampfer 2013; Hickmann 
2016). From a policy perspective, it will be interesting to find out whether increasing the authority of 
the climate governance framework is likely to affect perceived legitimacy positively or negatively, or 
have no effect. 
 
3. Study Design 
We use an experimental design to investigate the causal effect of increased authority of 
global governance institutions, specifically, the climate governance framework, on citizens’ 
legitimacy perceptions. Though in reality the authority of the global climate governance framework 
is fixed, an experimental approach enables us to study the implications of institutional features 
reflecting varying degrees of authority in a systematic way. The remainder of this section starts with 
a brief discussion of the climate governance framework and its relevance. We then describe the 
experimental treatments (i.e., levels of authority), the response variable (i.e., perceived legitimacy), 
the survey design, and the statistical approach. 
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3.1 Global Climate Governance  
We focus on the climate governance framework for two reasons. First, climate change is a global 
problem. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from everywhere on Earth accumulate in the global 
atmosphere and affect everyone, albeit to different degrees. Solving this problem thus requires action 
worldwide in terms of mitigation (i.e., reducing GHG emissions) and adaptation to climatic changes. 
The nature of this challenge raises interesting questions about the authority-legitimacy link in global 
governance, in the sense that pooling of authority could potentially deliver the most effective 
solution but could result in a loss of legitimacy given prior examples, such as the EU (Hooghe and 
Marks 2005) or WTO (Esty 2001).  
Second, effective climate change governance requires costly behavioral changes down to the 
level of individual citizens (Semenza et al. 2008). As noted by observers to the negotiations of the 
2015 Paris Agreement, “Climate change policy is almost entirely about domestic policy, and 
domestic policy is mostly driven by domestic politics” (Council of Foreign Relations 2015). To the 
extent that the authority of the climate governance framework increases and policies emanating from 
this framework reach ever deeper into the domains of local and national political authority, perceived 
legitimacy is likely to play an important role (Holcombe 2006; Bernstein 2011). Thus, perceived 
legitimacy matters greatly in this policy area, particularly in democratic countries. 
The climate governance framework, which is organized primarily through the UNFCCC, seeks to 
overcome the collective action problem in global climate change mitigation (Bernauer 2013). Its 
purpose is to help curb GHG emissions in order to avoid major negative socio-economic and 
ecological consequences that would result if temperatures rose by more than 1.5 to 2 degrees Celsius. 
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol set modest legally binding GHG emissions reduction targets for 
industrialized countries. Negotiations on a follow-up Protocol for the time period after the Kyoto 
Protocol, which ended in 2012, failed and negotiations retracted into a governance effort based on 
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self-selected, nonbinding emission reduction targets under the 2015 Paris Agreement. The latter 
approach can be characterized as a pledge-and-review system or internationally coordinated 
unilateralism. Current estimates hold that global warming will exceed 2 degrees even if all existing 
pledges were fulfilled.2 This means that more ambitious policies are required to prevent dangerous 
levels of global warming. 
Policymaking in this area has been accompanied by contentious debates over how to best 
organize the governance effort. The poles of the debate emphasize authoritative target setting and 
decision-making at the global level on the one side and decentralized bottom-up efforts on the other. 
In fact, some scholars have questioned whether the existing climate governance framework is even 
necessary to solve the climate change problem, given the variety of decentralized sub- and non-state 
governance frameworks and actors (Keohane and Victor 2011; Bulkeley and Newell 2015). 
However, as Hickmann (2016) notes, even though national governments and international 
institutions are not the only relevant actors in the global response to climate change, the principles, 
norms, and rules established in the UNFCCC climate governance framework are important for 
setting the agenda in climate policy and informing the initiatives launched at transnational, sub-
national and non-governmental levels. Moreover, even if authority is shifting away from the global 
climate governance framework back towards national and local levels, observers point out that the 
collective action problem must ultimately be resolved via globally agreed on binding targets 
(Bernauer 2013; Rogelj, Meinhausen, and Knutti. 2012). In light of this, we are interested in what a 
renewed shift of authority towards the global level would entail for legitimacy, and how much 
authority could be shifted without a loss of legitimacy. 
Empirically, we focus on public opinion in Germany and the United States. Germany, the largest 
economy in Europe, advocates ambitious climate policies, whereas the US, the world’s largest GHG 
emitter in historical terms, did not join the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and has no coherent federal climate                                                         
2 http://climateactiontracker.org/ 
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policy in place. Moreover, for the last half century, the German public has been exposed to 
supranational governance in the EU, while the US public has not. We are interested in whether our 
empirical findings are similar or different across these two very different political contexts.  
In the survey, we do not explicitly refer to the UNFCCC. Instead, we use the term “Global 
Climate Conference”. Using a fictional institution resembling the real governance framework allows 
us to vary levels of authority and avoid priming effects inherent in associating the negotiations with 
the UN, which on its own may evoke polarized reactions. In the survey, participants first read an 
introduction to climate change followed by an introduction to a Global Climate Conference.   
[Page 1] 
 
We burn large amounts of coal, oil and gas when producing energy and in transportation. When 
we burn these fossil fuels, we emit carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere. Growing amounts 
of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere cause the global temperature to rise. This is 
commonly referred to as climate change or global warming. To prevent further temperature 
increases, governments from around the world are meeting to design a worldwide strategy.   
 
[Page 2] 
 
Specifically, governments meet annually at the Global Climate Conference, which includes 190 
countries along with [the United States/Germany]. Their aim is to negotiate an international 
agreement to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions worldwide. This meeting is also known 
as the Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
  
Negotiations at the Global Climate Conference focus on two issues: 
• How much should worldwide carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions be reduced? 
• How much should each country reduce its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions to achieve the 
worldwide goal?  
  
 
 
3.2 Treatments  
 The key explanatory variable in our experiment is authority. We conceptualize authority on 
two dimensions: voting procedure at the international bargaining stage (consensus or majoritarian 
voting) and domestic ratification requirements (automatic implementation or implementation only 
after approval by the national legislature). These two dimensions allow us to generate experimentally 
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manipulated variation of authority in global governance using the typology by Hooghe and Marks 
(2015) (see Figure 1). Hooghe and Marks (2015) define two facets of authority: pooling and 
delegation. We concentrate on pooling, which concerns the rules under which states make decisions 
and the procedure through which those decisions are implemented at the domestic level. According 
to this conceptualization, the authority of the climate governance framework is fairly limited as it 
currently stands. Consensus voting and implementation only after approval by the respective 
country’s national legislature requires the least pooling of authority. Majoritarian voting and 
automatic implementation lies at the other end of the spectrum and involves a high degree of 
pooling. In between these two levels of delegation fall the other two conditions: Consensus-
Automatic and Majority-Legislature (see Figure 1). In our experiment, the status quo (i.e., 
Consensus-Legislature) serves as the baseline. Table 1 shows the wording of the four treatment 
conditions. Survey participants were randomly assigned to one of the four combinations after having 
read the introductory text above. 
INSERT FIGURE 1  
INSERT TABLE 1 
We included three comprehension questions and a manipulation check. The comprehension 
questions capture whether survey participants (1) understood the purpose of the Global Climate 
Conference as well as (2) the voting and (3) domestic implementation procedure to which they were 
assigned. In the empirical analysis, we assess the robustness of our findings by excluding 
participants who incorrectly responded to one or more of the comprehension questions on their 
second attempt.  
The manipulation check helps us understand whether the treatment conditions were effective 
in manipulating participants’ perceptions of authority. By implication, it also provides information 
on whether participants understood the consequences of a particular voting rule and implementation 
arrangement. We asked participants: Do you think this process of deciding whether and how much 
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[the United States/Germany] must reduce its carbon dioxide emissions gives [the United 
States/Germany] too little or too much control over this policy? (No control, too little control, 
sufficient control, too much control).  
The results indicate that participants perceived the pooling of authority as intended. In terms 
of domestic ratification requirements, participants from both countries perceived ratification by the 
legislature as providing significantly more control over climate policy than automatic 
implementation. In regards to the international voting procedure, only US participants perceived the 
consensus rule as providing significantly more control by the American government than majority 
voting. By and large, these results confirm that participants perceived the experimentally induced 
variation in authority as intended and understood the implications of increasing authority. Figure 2 
shows the probability of a participant selecting no control in response to the manipulation check. The 
probability of doing so after exposure to the Consensus-Legislature treatment is significantly lower 
than the Majority-Automatic treatment for the US and German samples. The Consensus-Automatic 
treatment falls in-between the extremes, and the effect of the Majority-Legislature treatment is not 
significantly different from the Consensus-Legislature treatment. The probability plots for the 
response categories too little control, sufficient control, and too much control can be found in SI-1 
(Supplementary Information Section 1).  
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
 
3.3 Dependent Variable  
Since no widely accepted survey items exist to measure legitimacy perceptions of global 
governance institutions, we build on the conceptual and theoretical literature on legitimacy to 
construct three different measures. This approach serves to assess the internal validity and robustness 
of our results. 
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Tallberg and Zürn (this volume) define legitimacy as the belief that authority is being 
appropriately exercised, which in turn, causes a continued deference to authority. We use two survey 
items to gauge these two facets of legitimacy in this definition, appropriateness and deference.3 We 
asked survey participants whether they agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or disagree with 
I think the Global Climate Conference serves an important role in society (APPROPRIATE) and The 
Global Climate Conference should continue to make decisions in the future (DEFERENCE). If 
participants agree or somewhat agree with these statements, we interpret them as the Global Climate 
Conference being perceived as legitimate, while disagree or somewhat disagree means that 
participants perceive the Global Climate Conference as illegitimate.4 It is important to emphasize 
that this is distinct from authority, which is the legal right to make decisions in an area. Legitimacy 
implies that an individual believes that an institution should continue to make decisions.  
These two measures, in isolation, capture a narrow conceptualization of legitimacy. A broader 
conceptualization of legitimacy would be the perception that the actions of an institution are 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, and beliefs (Suchman 1995, 
Tallberg and Zürn this volume). APPROPRIATE and DEFERENCE fail to capture an individual’s 
social affinity with an institution. This interpretation is referred to as “substance-grounded” 
legitimacy, that is, legitimacy beliefs that result from individuals perceiving the goals or purpose of 
an institution as inherently desirable (Scott 2013). To measure this broader conceptualization, we 
added three more items. We asked survey participants whether they agree, somewhat agree, 
somewhat disagree, or disagree with the following three statements, in addition to DEFERENCE 
and APPROPRIATE:                                                          
3 Other studies measure related concepts such as confidence or trust as proxies for legitimacy.  We argue that these are 
necessary conditions of legitimacy but not sufficient. Measuring only these concepts can present a misleading picture. 
For example, it is possible to be confident in an institution to perform its duties, e.g., Stalin’s Communist Regime, but 
not view its authority as being appropriately exercised, i.e., legitimate.  
4 We opted for an ordinal scale for these two questions instead of a binary (Agree/Disagree) based on participant 
feedback from a pilot survey at the end of 2014. In the 2014 pilot survey, we randomized binary and ordinal response 
categories between participants. Several participants who received the binary response option commented that they were 
unable to express nuanced opinions, while we received no comments from those who received the ordinal scale. This is 
why we decided to use the ordinal response category in the present survey. 
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• The principles of the Global Climate Conference match my own. 
• I sympathize with the goals of the Global Climate Conference. 
• I believe the Global Climate Conference is necessary. 
We randomized the order of the five questions between participants. For robustness checks, we 
aggregated these three additional items together with APPROPRIATE and DEFERENCE using item 
response theory (for details see SI-2). This aggregate measure of all five items is referred to as 5-
ITEM in the robustness checks.  
It is worth noting that these dependent variable items focus on legitimacy perceptions with 
respect to how climate policy-making should unfold, rather than on climate policy preferences per 
set. That is, while climate change deniers are likely to find global climate policy-making illegitimate 
almost by definition, those supporting at least some steps towards mitigating GHG emissions are 
likely to differ strongly in how policies to that end should be established and implemented.  
 
3.4 Survey Design  
The survey was designed by the authors and fielded by YouGov to its online panels in 
Germany and the US between the 12th and 22nd February 2016. The respondents were matched to a 
specific sampling frame in order to approximate a sample that is representative of the German and 
US populations (N=1600 each). For example, in Germany, YouGov interviewed 1718 respondents 
and then matched them by gender, age, and education, to a sampling frame, reducing the number to 
1600 in the final dataset (for specifics see SI-3).  
The survey started with a brief description of climate change and the purpose of the climate 
governance framework referred to as the Global Climate Conference, followed by a description of 
the voting procedure as well as domestic implementation requirements. After each of these 
descriptions, participants received a comprehension check item. If the answer was incorrect, they 
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were sent back to the prior description/treatment. After their second attempt, participants could 
proceed regardless of whether the response was correct. Table 2 summarizes, by treatment group, the 
proportion of participants who answered the three comprehension questions correctly by their second 
attempt. In both countries, 3 percent of the sample failed to correctly identify the purpose of the 
climate governance framework (first comprehension question) twice, 9 percent misunderstood the 
voting rule (second comprehension question) twice, and 13 percent misunderstood the ratification 
requirements twice (third comprehension question). Overall, 20.6 percent and 15.4 percent of 
American and German respondents, respectively, failed to answer one or more of the questions 
correctly by their second try. In the robustness checks, we run analyses on the reduced sample, which 
only includes participants who answered all three comprehension questions correctly by their second 
attempt. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
Around 15 percent of the participants, in both countries, failed to answer all three 
comprehension check questions correctly after both attempts across all treatment groups. However, 
in the two treatments involving the automatic implementation of the climate agreement in the US, 
nearly 25 percent failed to answer correctly by the second try (see Table 2). One possible reason is 
that this treatment seemed too unrealistic to participants. We used data from the following survey 
item to assess this possibility: Now that you have read the description at the beginning of the survey, 
how well do you understand what the Global Climate Conference is and how it works? (Very well, 
well, to some extent, a bit, not at all). We tested for significant differences in the distribution of 
responses to this item across treatments in the German and US samples. This would indicate whether 
the automatic implementation treatment was regarded as unrealistic or overly confusing from the 
viewpoint of US participants. However, we did not observe significant differences in the distribution 
of responses to this item across treatments in either sample.   
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 After the treatments and comprehension questions, we summarized the treatments in a flow 
chart to ensure participants understood the voting rule of the climate governance framework and the 
domestic implementation procedure. Then we measured participants’ perceived legitimacy of the 
climate governance framework (i.e., dependent variable).5  
Participants then received four blocks of questions measuring their climate change concern, 
knowledge on climate change, self-reported interest in international politics, and understanding of 
international politics. We randomized the order of these blocks of questions as well as the questions 
within each block between participants.  The survey ended with  a set of demographic questions (the 
wording of all items is shown in SI-7).  
 
 
3.5 Statistical Approach  
 For the two main dependent variables, APPROPRIATE and DEFERENCE, we used ordinal 
logistic regressions and estimate the predicted probabilities of agreeing and disagreeing with 
APPROPRIATE and DEFERENCE after each treatment. We calculate the differences between the 
predicted probabilities of the status quo (Consensus-Legislature) and each of the other treatments 
(Consensus-Automatic, Majority-Legislature, Majority-Automatic), for example, 
Pr(Agree|Consensus-Legislature) – Pr(Agree|Majority-Legislature). We bootstrapped to calculate 
the standard errors of these differences by resampling data with replacement (N=3200) over 1000 
iterations.6 7    
                                                        
5 We randomized the order of the five legitimacy items and response scales between participants, which were followed 
by the manipulation check. 
6 Bootstrapping is a way of estimating statistical parameters from the sample by resampling with replacement. Like other 
non-parametric approaches, bootstrapping does not make any assumptions about the distribution of the sample. The main 
assumption behind bootstrapping is that the sample distribution is a reasonably good approximation of the population 
distribution. This is a reasonable assumption in our case because YouGov provided weighted samples of German and 
American populations. It is for this reason that we chose bootstrapping over other simulation methods that generate new 
data as a means of estimating these standard errors. In addition, other simulation techniques would have required 
assumptions about the distribution of the data, which we prefer to avoid.  
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 To estimate the robustness of results using the 5-ITEM measure, which is continuous, we use 
an OLS regression to calculate the mean predicted values on the 5-ITEM scale for each treatment. 
We calculated the difference in means for each treatment compared to the status quo (i.e., 
Consensus-Legislature). We then bootstrap to calculate the standard errors in the same manner as 
above.  
 
4. Results  
We start by reporting descriptive statistics for the dependent variable followed by the main 
results. We then engage in a series of robustness checks focusing on the additional 5-ITEM measure 
and the reduced sample that excludes respondents who did not correctly answer all comprehension 
questions by their second attempt.  
 
4.1 Legitimacy Perceptions  
 Figures 3 and 4 show the distributions of responses on the two dependent variables, 
APPROPRIATE and DEFERENCE, respectively, irrespective of treatment. The distributions of the 
entire sample (i.e., including all treatments) shown in Figures 3 and 4 are left-skewed, meaning there 
could be ceiling effects. Figure 5 shows the distribution of scores on the combined 5-ITEM measure 
for the entire sample that we use for robustness checks. In Figure 5, there is a peak in the German 
sample at around 0, which indicates an ambivalent perception of legitimacy, and 1, which indicates a 
high level of perceived legitimacy. The shape is slightly different for the US sample, where there is a 
peak around -2, indicating a low level of perceived legitimacy, 0, and 1.  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
7 There is some debate over how much iteration is necessary. We started with 10,000 and shifted to 1000 after initial 
results were similar.  
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INSERT FIGURE 3, 4, and 5 
 
4.2 Effects of Authority on Legitimacy Perceptions   
For APPROPRIATE and DEFERENCE, we observe no significant differences in the 
probability of agreeing or disagreeing between the status quo (Consensus-Legislature) and the other 
three treatment groups for the German and US samples (including all participants). Thus, there are 
no significant differences in legitimacy perceptions across treatments. Figures 6 and 7 show the 
histogram plots of the differences in predicted probabilities of agreeing with APPROPRIATE 
between the Majority-Automatic and Consensus-Legislature treatments for the full samples. QQ 
plots of 1000 iterations show that the distribution is close to normal (see Figures SI-4.1 and 4.2 in SI-
4). Therefore, we calculate the 95 percent confidence intervals using the normal distribution. The 
difference in predicted probabilities of agreeing with APPROPRIATE, i.e., perceiving the global 
climate governance framework as legitimate, in the US and Germany between Consensus-
Legislature (baseline condition) and Majority-Automatic treatments is (-0.13, 0.05) and (-0.03, 0.15), 
respectively, with 95 percent confidence. Both confidence intervals include zero; therefore, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis, that the authority of the climate governance framework does not 
affect citizens’ legitimacy perceptions. The confidence intervals and significance for other treatments 
can be found in SI-4.  
INSERT FIGURE 6 and 7 
The results thus far show that, contrary to a widespread presumption, increasing the authority 
of the climate governance framework does not per se undermine its perceived legitimacy. The 
manipulation and comprehension questions show that participants understand the implications of 
different decision and implementation rules. However, we cannot find empirical evidence for a 
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tradeoff between authority and legitimacy, in the sense of one coming at the expense of the other, or 
for an amplifying effect, in the sense of one increasing the other.  
It is possible that subsets of participants perceive authority differently in the same treatment, 
which could then lead to effects cancelling each other out and causing insignificant results. For 
example, participants who consider that their government has no control over climate policy under 
the Consensus-Legislature condition might cancel out the effect of those who perceive their 
government as having too much control or sufficient control under Consensus-Legislature treatment. 
Table 3 shows participants’ perceptions of authority in each treatment, in terms of the total number 
of participants from each country and the percentage. For example, 13 participants or 3 percent of 
the German sample believed Germany had no control in the Consensus-Legislature treatment. There 
are only a small number of individuals who failed to perceive treatments as intended. For example, 3 
percent and 8 percent of Germans and US respondents receiving the Majority-Automatic treatment, 
respectively, perceived the Majority-Automatic treatment as leaving their respective countries too 
much control over climate policy.  
INSERT TABLE 3 
Due to the relatively small numbers in a few of the sub-groups, we were unable to use 
bootstrapping. We ran ordinal logistic regressions on APPROPRIATE and DEFERENCE, 
interacting our treatments with the manipulation check item, i.e., perceived authority. The interaction 
effect between perceived authority and treatments is insignificant (see SI-5 (a) for Table SI-5.1 of 
results). Therefore, we can rule out the concern that effects are cancelling each other out.  
It is important to note that in the analysis above we find that citizens’ perceptions of authority 
are significantly correlated with legitimacy (see Table SI-5.1). In the German sample, those who 
perceive the climate governance framework as giving Germany no control or too much control over 
climate policy tend to perceive this framework as significantly less legitimate, regardless of 
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treatment, than those who perceive the framework as providing too little control or sufficient control. 
In the US sample, those who perceive the climate governance framework as leaving the US with no 
control over climate policy perceive the framework as significantly less legitimate than those who 
perceive it as providing too little control, sufficient control, or too much. Importantly, neither result 
is a linear relationship. Rather, we find a more nuanced relationship between participants’ 
perceptions of authority and legitimacy. In the German sample, there seems to be an inverted-U 
shaped relationship between the perception of authority and legitimacy, while in the US sample, it 
seems that the climate governance framework is regarded as legitimate as long as the US retains a 
minimum amount of control. Perhaps this difference is due to Germany being embedded in a 
supranational institution, the European Union, for around half a century, whereas the US never 
joined any such institution. That is, Germans might recognize the pitfalls of having “too much 
control” over policy and benefits of relinquishing some control to a supranational institution, while 
US citizens lack such experience. Even though the relationship between perceived legitimacy and 
perceived authority is counter to expectations, it does indicate the citizens understand global 
governance and make these assessments.  
One other explanation for the null result could be that the effects of participants with different 
political ideologies cancel each other out. Norris (2000), for instance, finds that left-leaning ideology 
is associated with cosmopolitanism. Thus, the opposing effects for liberals and conservatives could 
be masking treatment effects on perceived legitimacy. To clarify this issue, we carried out ordinal 
logistic regressions on APPROPRIATENESS and DEFERENCE for the full sample, and included 
interaction effects between political ideology and authority of the climate governance framework 
(see SI–5 (b) for details on measurement, Tables SI-5.2 and SI-5.3 for results). The results show no 
significant interaction effects. Therefore, we can rule out this possibility. However, we do find 
similar results to Norris (2000) for the US sample. The more right-leaning a study participant is the 
less legitimate she/he finds the climate governance framework.  
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As discussed in the theory section, cognitive mobilization and climate concern might also 
moderate the effect of authority on legitimacy. We address each of these possibilities in turn.  
We measured cognitive mobilization by asking participants: How interested are you in 
international politics? (Extremely interested, very interested, somewhat interested, not at all 
interested). We then used a similar approach as above (i.e., bootstrapping on differences in predicted 
probabilities) amongst those who are extremely interested and not at all interested. The results are 
inconsistent. For individuals who are extremely interested and in the US sample, there is a significant 
difference in the probability of agreeing with DEFERENCE between the Consensus-Legislature and 
Majority-Automatic treatments (-0.70, -0.13, with 95 percent confidence). Similarly, there is a 
significant difference in the probability of disagreeing with DEFERENCE (0.002, 0.33, with 95 
percent confidence). This means that US participants who are more cognitively mobilized perceive 
pooling more authority in the climate governance framework as more legitimate. However, there is 
no significant difference in the probability of agreeing with APPROPRIATE between the 
Consensus-Legislature and Majority-Automatic conditions for more cognitively mobilized 
individuals in the US sample.  For the other treatments, we find insignificant differences in perceived 
legitimacy between the baseline (Consensus-Legislature) and other treatment conditions for either 
measure of legitimacy amongst cognitive mobilized individuals in the full samples from both 
countries (for confidence intervals see SI-4 (a)).  
Climate change concern is measured using item wordings from the PEW’s Index of Climate 
Concern (Pew Research Center 2015). This measure is an additive index comprised of the following 
items: 
• In your view, is global climate change a very serious problem, somewhat serious, not too 
serious or not a problem? (4-very serious problem, 3-somewhat serious, 2-not too, 1-serious 
or not a problem).  
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• Do you think global climate change is harming people around the world now, will harm 
people in the next few years, will not harm people for many years or will never harm people? 
(4-Harming people around the world now, 3-Will harm people in the next few years, 2-Will 
not harm people for many years, 1-Will never harm people).  
• How concerned are you, if at all, that global climate change will harm you personally at 
some point in your lifetime? Are you very concerned, somewhat concerned, not too 
concerned or not at all concerned? (4-very concerned, 3-somewhat concerned, 2-not too 
concerned, 1- not at all concerned).  
Scores range from 3 (no concern) to 12 (high concern).  
We bootstrapped differences in predicted probabilities of agreeing and disagreeing with our 
dependent variables for highly concerned individuals (score of 12) and those with low levels of 
climate change concern (score of 3). For the full samples, we find insignificant differences in 
perceived legitimacy between the baseline (Consensus-Legislature) and the other treatment 
conditions for either measure of perceived legitimacy amongst those who are very concerned and not 
at all concerned about climate change (see SI – 4(c) Tables 4.6 – 4.9). In addition, we conducted 
ordinal regressions with APPROPRIATE and DEFERENCE as the dependent variables, for the full 
samples and interacting climate change concern with levels of authority (i.e. treatment groups). 
These relationships are statistically insignificant. However, climate change concern is a significant 
predictor of perceived legitimacy: as concern increases so does the perceived legitimacy of the 
climate governance framework independent of treatments. This again suggests that prior attitudes 
towards climate change risks and policy are more important drivers of perceived legitimacy than 
authority levels. We will return to this issue further below.  In the supplementary information (SI-8) 
we discuss a series of robustness checks, all of which end up supporting the main results presented 
here. 
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4.3 Factoring In Procedural and Performance Assessment 
Should we interpret the lack of an effect of authority on legitimacy as evidence that citizens 
cannot understand how political decisions are made when it comes to climate governance? We 
believe that this conclusion would be premature and requires further analysis. As a first step, we 
examine treatment effects on individuals’ perceptions of procedure and performance in global 
climate governance, and whether these perceptions are associated with perceived legitimacy. The 
“citizens are ignorant” claim, in order to be empirically supported, would require demonstration of 
an insignificant relationship between: (1) perceived authority and actual authority, (2) perceived 
legitimacy and perceptions of procedural and performance quality, as well as (3) perceived authority 
and perceived legitimacy. 
For this analysis, we use survey items gauging perceptions of the climate governance 
framework’s procedure and performance (see SI-7). As noted in Section 2.1, critics of global 
governance commonly point to a democratic deficit in terms of deficient participation, 
accountability, and representation (Grant and Keohane 2005; Hobolt 2012; Norris 2000; Slaughter 
2005; Wilkinson and Hughes 2002). We measured perceptions of the democratic quality of the 
climate governance framework using: The Global Climate Conference is undemocratic (agree, 
somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, disagree). Another procedural concern in global governance is 
infringement on national sovereignty. We thus asked participants: No country should be pressured 
into reducing its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions if it does not want to (agree, somewhat agree, 
somewhat disagree, disagree). Lastly, to measure individuals’ perceptions of the climate governance 
framework’s performance, we asked: It does not matter how negotiations are conducted and what 
the voting rules are, the Global Climate Conference is too ineffective to stop climate change (agree, 
somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, disagree). 
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 We carried out ordinal logistic regressions using the three items as dependent variables, with 
the treatments serving as the main explanatory variables. We find an insignificant relationship 
between authority levels and participants’ perceptions of procedure as well as performance of global 
climate governance. The results are the same for the full and the reduced samples (for details, see SI-
6). 
 We continued by estimating ordinal logistic regressions with these three items as explanatory 
variables and legitimacy measures as dependent variables (APPROPRIATE, DEFERENCE, 5-ITEM 
measure). Table 4 shows the results for the full samples. The results remain the same for the reduced 
samples from Germany and the US. It turns out that individuals’ perceptions of the procedure and 
performance of the global climate governance framework are significantly associated with perceived 
legitimacy. People who perceive the global climate governance framework as more “democratic” 
and “effective” perceive it as more legitimate. Lastly, people who believe that the climate 
governance framework will pressure their country perceive it as less legitimate. In other words, our 
results indicate that citizens relate their perceptions of process and performance quality with their 
evaluation of legitimacy. However, the level of authority of the global climate governance 
framework does not seem to significantly affect these perceptions. 
INSERT TABLE 4  
We also asked survey participants follow-up questions to better understand why they view 
the Global Climate Conference as democratic or undemocratic. In the full sample, 872 participants 
selected agree or somewhat agree to the statement, The Global Climate Conference is undemocratic, 
while 1591 participants answered disagree or somewhat disagree. 737 respondents skipped this 
question. If participants answered agree or somewhat agree, then they were asked: The Global 
Climate Conference is undemocratic because … while those who answered disagree or somewhat 
disagree were asked The Global Climate Conference is democratic because... We then showed 
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participants a list of reasons and asked them to click all that applied if any. The options were 
identical for the two groups. Table 5 and 6 show the proportions of participants who selected specific 
reasons. The most common reasons for those who perceived the Global Climate Conference as 
undemocratic included countries in negotiations are undemocratic followed by negotiations are 
dominated by business interests. For participants who believed the Global Climate Conference is 
democratic, 65 percent selected Voting rule is democratic followed by Implementation procedure is 
democratic.  
INSERT TABLE 5 AND 6  
No one reason explains why the Global Climate Conference was perceived as undemocratic 
or democratic. What we can conclude from this is that individuals have different procedural and 
performance standards; therefore, the same attributes can illicit different reactions. Searching for 
universally legitimate criteria, such as a “perfect” voting rule would thus be bound to fail.  Pooling 
greater authority is neither a blessing nor a curse. It seems to depend on the individual whether this is 
perceived as legitimate or illegitimate. In summary, while perceptions of procedural and 
performance quality are significantly correlated with legitimacy, the criteria that inform these 
perceptions of procedural and performance quality vary extensively between individuals.  
 
5. Discussion 
 Contemporary campaigns by populist political movements on the left and right, as well as 
specific instances of political backlash, such as the widespread opposition to TTIP, the EU, the 
WTO, and other international institutions suggest that shifting political authority from the domestic 
to the international level could come at the expense of legitimacy. In this paper, we examined 
whether changes in authority affect the legitimacy perceptions of citizens in the context of climate 
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governance, using population-based survey experiments fielded in Germany and the US. 
The results cast doubt on a link between the authority of the global climate governance 
framework and citizens’ legitimacy perceptions. Nuanced shifts in authority, such as changes 
towards majority decision making at the international level and automatic implementation of 
international decisions domestically, do not significantly affect citizens’ legitimacy perceptions. It is 
important to emphasize that this result is not due to citizens’ lack of understanding of the 
implications of changes in authority. In fact, citizens do understand that their government loses 
control over climate policy as international pooling of authority increases. Moreover, legitimacy 
perceptions are significantly correlated with citizens’ assessments of procedural and performance 
quality. But it appears that shifts in authority as such do not affect these perceptions, which in turn 
explains the insignificant effect of variation in international authority on perceived legitimacy. The 
results suggest, however, that the authority of the climate governance framework affects legitimacy 
perceptions amongst cognitively mobilized individuals, and that this relationship is mutually 
reinforcing. As the authority of the climate governance framework increases, so does its legitimacy, 
showing that increasing authority does not necessarily come at the expense of legitimacy.  
To put our results into the broader context of legitimacy of global governance institutions, we 
find very limited support for a direct effect of changes in authority on legitimacy, but identify a 
direct effect of perceptions of procedural quality and performance. This implies that as long as shifts 
of authority do not negatively affect citizens’ perceptions of procedural quality and performance 
there should not be a corresponding effect on legitimacy. Overall, these findings suggest that there is 
considerable room for increasing the authority of global governance institutions, provided this can be 
done in ways that ascertain high procedural and output performance quality. 
 Future research could vary the policy area as part of experimental treatment conditions. It 
would be interesting to discern differences in effects increasing authority levels of global governance 
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in areas such as immigration, taxation, trade, banking regulation, or security might have on perceived 
legitimacy by specific types of citizens. Conventional wisdom, at least from the perspective of 
debates on the EU and controversy on how far European integration should go, is that this should be 
the case in the EU, but systematic empirical evidence on this claim is currently lacking. 
It is possible that citizens hold strong priors on the issue of climate governance and 
associated agreements. If survey participants hold such strong priors, nuances such as the properties 
of decision and domestic implementation rules may seem less relevant and may be overlooked when 
citizens form their legitimacy perceptions (see Hyde, Kelley, and Neilson this volume). Indeed, when 
regressing our survey participants’ climate concern on the three measures of legitimacy, we found a 
significant relationship. Overall, it is possible that these priors have made it hard for the authority 
shift to “cut through”. 
  What do our findings mean for policy making? In light of the points just made, they suggest 
that rather subtle shifts of authority from national to global governance institutions, in themselves, 
are unlikely to create a political backlash and result in a loss of legitimacy. However, if these shifts 
are popularized as “negative” by elites or the media, such as in the case of the United Kingdom’s 
role in the EU, and these critiques are salient to citizens, shifting authority could induce a backlash. 
That is, shifts in authority might not per se affect legitimacy, though policymakers could still frame 
these shifts positively or negatively and thus affect perceived legitimacy (see Dellmuth and Tallberg, 
this volume).  
With respect to global climate policy in particular, and from the perspective of our findings, 
the current trend towards decreasing authority of the global climate governance framework under the 
2015 Paris Agreement might be unwarranted. Most citizens do not seem to mind increasing the 
authority of the global climate governance framework. And for those that do, increases in authority 
seem to enhance their legitimacy perceptions.    
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International Voting Rule  
Majority Consensus 
At the meeting, countries negotiate their 
positions and draft a proposed agreement. Once 
countries complete these negotiations, they will 
vote for or against a proposed agreement. As 
mentioned before, the proposed agreement 
focuses on two issues:  
• How much should worldwide carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions be reduced? 
• How much should each country reduce 
its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions to 
achieve the worldwide goal? 
The voting rule is as follows:  
• If more than half of the participating 
countries (the majority) vote in favor of 
the proposed agreement, then the 
proposed agreement will pass and 
negotiations will end even if [the United 
States/Germany] voted against. 
• If more than half of the participating 
countries vote against the proposed 
agreement, then the proposed agreement 
will not pass even if [the United 
States/Germany] voted in favor. In that 
case, there is no agreement and countries 
will resume negotiations next year. 
At the meeting, countries negotiate their 
positions and draft a proposed agreement. Once 
countries complete these negotiations, they will 
vote for or against a proposed agreement. As 
mentioned before, the proposed agreement 
focuses on two issues:  
• How much should worldwide carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions be reduced? 
• How much should each country reduce 
its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions to 
achieve the worldwide goal? 
The voting rule is the following: 
• If all participating countries (unanimity) 
vote in favor of the proposed agreement, 
then the proposed agreement will pass 
and negotiations will end as long as [the 
United States/Germany] also votes in 
favor. 
• If any participating country votes 
against the proposed agreement, then the 
proposed agreement will not pass even if 
[the United States/Germany] voted in 
favor. In that case, there is no agreement 
and countries will resume negotiations 
next year. 
 
Domestic Ratification Procedure 
Automatic Implementation Legislature 
Once international negotiations end and if an 
agreement passes, the agreement needs to be 
implemented within participating countries (at 
the domestic level). Imagine that all countries 
participating in the Global Climate Conference, 
including [the United States/Germany], decided 
before the negotiations to automatically 
implement an agreement if one is passed. This 
means that if the Conference passes an 
agreement, [the United States/Germany] must 
reduce its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by the 
amount specified in that agreement. However, if 
the Conference does not pass an agreement, [the 
Once international negotiations end and if an 
agreement passes, the agreement needs to be 
implemented within participating countries (at 
the domestic level). Imagine that all countries 
participating in the Global Climate Conference, 
including the United States, decided before the 
negotiations to implement an agreement reached 
by the Conference only after their respective 
parliament/legislature back home has approved 
the agreement as well. This means that if 
[Congress/ Bundestag or Bundesrat] approves 
the agreement, [the United States/Germany] must 
reduce its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by the 
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United States/Germany] has no obligation to 
reduce its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. 
 
amount specified in that agreement. However, if 
[Congress/ Bundestag or Bundesrat] does not 
approve the agreement, [the United 
States/Germany] has no obligation to reduce its 
carbon (CO2) emissions.  
Table 1: Treatments in the English survey. German translations can be found in SI-7 (Supplementary Information 
Section 7). Participants were randomly assigned to either the Majority or Consensus treatment and then randomly 
assigned to the Automatic Implementation or Legislature treatment.    
 Consensus-
Legislature 
Consensus-
Automatic 
Majority-
Automatic 
Majority-
Legislature 
Germany 404 (0.90) 406 (0.83) 390 (0.82) 400 (0.84) 
USA 403  (0.86) 386 (0.73) 406 (0.74) 405 (0.84) 
Table 2: Number of participants in each group. The percentage in brackets indicates the number of participants who 
answered all three comprehension questions correctly by their second attempt.  
 
  Consensus- 
Legislature 
(Low Authority) 
Consensus-
Automatic 
Majority-
Legislature 
Majority-
Automatic 
(High Authority) 
  Germany USA Germany USA Germany USA Germany USA 
Pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
A
ut
ho
ri
ty
 
No 
control  
13   
(0.03) 
31 
 (0.05) 
23  
(0.06) 
61 
(0.16) 
11   
(0.28) 
36  
(0.09) 
23  
(0.06) 
61 
(0.15) 
Too little  145   
(0.36) 
89 
(0.18) 
168  
(0.41) 
99  
(0.26) 
147  
(0.37) 
87  
(0.22) 
168  
(0.43) 
99  
(0.24) 
Sufficient  173  
(0.43) 
193  
(0.48) 
186  
(0.46) 
214  
(0.55) 
173  
(0.43) 
202  
(0.50) 
186 
(0.48) 
214  
(0.53) 
Too much  73  
(0.18) 
89  
(0.18) 
12  
(0.03) 
31 
(0.08) 
69  
(0.17) 
79  
(0.20) 
 12 
(0.03) 
31 
(0.08) 
 Total  404  
(1.00) 
402 
(1.00) 
389 
(1.00) 
405 
(1.00) 
400 
(1.00) 
404 
(1.00) 
389 
(1.00) 
405 
(1.00) 
Table 3: How participants in each treatment perceive authority. The vertical column lists the answer categories to the 
manipulation check question: do you think this process of deciding whether and how much [the United States/Germany] 
must reduce its carbon dioxide emissions gives [the United States/Germany] too little or too much control over this 
policy? The whole number is the total number of participants from each country in each treatment by how they perceive 
authority, and the number in parentheses is the percentage. 
  APPROPRIATE DEFERENCE 5-ITEM 
U
nd
em
oc
ra
tic
 Somewhat disagree -0.32 ** 
(0.11) 
-0.42*** 
(0.12) 
-0.19*** 
(0.05) 
Somewhat agree -0.64 *** 
(0.12) 
-0.70*** 
(0.13) 
-0.34*** 
(0.05) 
Agree -1.22 *** 
(0.15) 
-1.19*** 
(0.16) 
-0.55*** 
(0.06) 
In ef
f
ec
t  Somewhat disagree -0.35 
(0.18) 
-0.29 
(0.19) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
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Somewhat agree -0.47 ** 
(0.17) 
-0.43* 
(0.18) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
Agree -1.20 *** 
(0.18) 
-1.08*** 
(0.19) 
-0.40*** 
(0.07) 
Pr
es
su
re
 
Somewhat disagree -0.50 *** 
(0.12) 
-0.61*** 
(0.13) 
-0.23 *** 
(0.05) 
Somewhat agree -0.67 *** 
(0.13) 
-0.99*** 
(0.14) 
-0.42*** 
(0.06) 
Agree -1.65 *** 
(0.15) 
-1.84*** 
(0.15) 
-0.82*** 
(0.06) 
 USA -0.07*** 
(0.09) 
-0.73*** 
(0.09) 
-0.23*** 
(0.04) 
 N 21198  2119 2119 
 Link logit logit  
 AIC 4630.04 4292.11 5481.32 
Table 4: Effects of perceived procedural quality and performance on legitimacy. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. 
We used an ordinal logistic regression to calculate the results for APPROPRIATE and DEFERENCE. The coefficients 
cannot be interpreted directly. We use OLS regression to calculate the results for the 5-ITEM variable. This is why there 
is a link function for APPROPRIATE and DEFERENCE and not for the 5-ITEM measure.  
 
 Selected Not selected 
Voting rule is undemocratic  0.26 0.74 
Implementation procedure is 
undemocratic 
 
0.36 0.64 
Countries in negotiations are 
undemocratic 
 
0.41 0.59 
Negotiations are dominated by 
business interests 
 
0.39 0.61 
Table 5: Reasons why survey participants view the Global Climate Conference as undemocratic   
 
 Selected Not selected 
Voting rule is democratic  0.65 0.35 
Implementation procedure is 
democratic 
 
0.41 0.59 
Countries in negotiations are 
democratic 
 
0.29 
 
0.71 
Negotiations are dominated by 0.17 0.93                                                         
8 These questions were at the end of the survey and optional for participants, which is why 1081 participants did not respond. We 
conducted ANOVA analyses to check for significant differences between those who did and did not respond to these three questions. 
Those who are somewhat, very, or extremely interested were more likely to respond to these questions, while those who are not 
interested were more likely to skip. In addition, males were more likely to respond than females. There were no significant differences 
between those who did and did not respond in regards to treatments, climate concern, country or age.  
  39 
business interests 
 
 
Table 6: Reasons why survey participants view the Global Climate Conference as democratic  
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Figure 1: Treatments by levels of authority  
 
Figure 2: Probability of selecting no control in response to the manipulation check. We conducted an ordinal logistic 
regression using manipulation check as the dependent variable and the treatments as well as country as the independent 
variables. We then estimated the predicted probabilities of selecting no control under the different treatments for each 
country. See SI-1 for the predicted probabilities of selecting the other answer categories.   
High
Authority
•Majority-Automatic
•Majority-Legislature
•Consensus-Automatic
Low
Authority
•Consensus-Legislature
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Figure 3: Distribution of responses to APPROPRIATE for German and American samples  
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of responses to DEFERENCE for German and American samples.  
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Figure 5: Distribution of 5-ITEM legitimacy measure for German and American samples. Negative values indicate low 
levels of perceived legitimacy while positive indicate high levels.    
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Figure 6: Difference in probability of agreeing between Consensus-Legislature (i.e., status quo) and Majority-Automatic 
(i.e., high pooling of authority) over 1000 iterations for the full American sample 
 
Figure 7: Difference in predicted probability of agreeing between Consensus-Legislature (i.e., status quo) and Majority-
Automatic (i.e., high pooling of authority) over 1000 iterations for the full German sample  
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SI-1 Manipulation Check Probability Plots  
To understand if participants perceived the continuum of authority as intended, we asked: Do you 
think this process of deciding whether and how much [the United States/Germany] must reduce its 
carbon dioxide emissions gives [the United States/Germany] too little or too much control over this 
policy? (No control, too little control, sufficient control, too much control). The probability of 
American and German participants in the full samples selecting too little, sufficient, and too much” 
control are below in Table SI-1.1, SI-1.2, and SI-1.3, respectively. The probability of participants 
selecting no control is in the Section 3.2.  
Participants in Germany and the USA are significantly more likely to select too little control after the 
Majority-Automatic treatment than the Consensus-Legislature treatment. Likewise, participants are 
significantly more likely to select sufficient or too much control after the Consensus-Legislature than 
Majority-Automatic treatment in both countries. The results are less clear for Majority-Legislature 
and Consensus-Automatic treatments. The differences in probability of selecting too little, sufficient, 
or too much control are insignificant for Majority-Legislature and Consensus-Legislature treatments 
in Germany and the United States. The probability of selecting too little control is significantly 
higher for the Consensus-Automatic treatment compared to Consensus-Legislature treatment and 
significantly lower compared to the Majority-Automatic treatment for the American sample. Results 
are similar for the German sample, but there is no significant difference in the probability of 
selecting too little control for Consensus-Automatic and Majority-Automatic. There are similar 
results for the probability of selecting sufficient and too much control. For these reasons, we can 
conclude that participants, at a minimum, understood the extremes of the continuum of authority.  
 
Table SI-1.1: The probability of German and American participants in the full sample selecting too 
little control.  
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Table SI-1.2: The probability of German and American participants in the full sample selecting 
sufficient control.   
 
Table SI-1.3: The probability of German and American participants in the full sample selecting too 
much control.   
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SI-2 5-ITEM Dependent Variable: IRT Results  
 
We calculated individuals’ legitimacy perceptions using Item Response Theory (IRT). Specifically, 
we used a Generalized Partial Credit Model because of the ordinal nature of the data. In IRT, an 
individual’s score represents the magnitude of the latent trait of the individual, which in this study, is 
their legitimacy perception of the climate governance framework. A benefit of IRT is it allows items 
to contribute differently to the latent trait unlike other aggregation techniques.  
First, we need to confirm that our items measure one latent trait. Results from the IRT show that 85 
percent of the variance is explained by one dimension.  The factor loadings are:  
 Factor 1 
The principles of the Global Climate 
Conference match my own. 
0.908 
I sympathize with the goals of the Global 
Climate Conference. 
0.893 
I believe the Global Climate Conference is 
necessary. 
0.965 
I think the GCC serves an important role in 
society. 
0.900 
The GCC should continue to make decisions in 
the future. 
0.955 
SS Loadings  4.276 
Proportion of Variance  0.855 
Table SI-2.1 Factor loadings from the GPCM  
GPCM also calculates difficulty and discrimination parameters. The number of discrimination 
parameters is M-1 where M is equal to the number of answer categories. Using the difficulty 
parameters, we can identify which items are contributing most to scoring the latent trait.  
 Discrimination 
Parameter 
Difficulty 
Parameter 1 
Difficulty 
Parameter 2 
Difficulty 
Parameter 3 
The principles of the 
Global Climate 
Conference match my 
own. 
3.679 4.938 8.124 6.84 
I sympathize with the 
goals of the Global 
Climate Conference. 
3.384 4.814 8.45 8.284 
I believe the Global 
Climate Conference is 
necessary. 
6.254 8.409 14.274 15.074 
I think the GCC serves 
an important role in 
society. 
3.518 4.875 8.056 7.551 
The GCC should 
continue to make 
decisions in the future. 
3.518 5.494 12.519 12.358 
Table SI-2.2 Parameter Estimates  
  48 
SI-3 Construction of US Sample  
 
United States  
 
YouGov interviewed 1847 respondents who were then matched down to a sample of 1600 to 
produce the final dataset. The respondents were matched to a sampling frame on gender, age, race, 
education, party identification, ideology, and political interest. The frame was constructed by 
stratified sampling from the full 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) sample with selection 
within strata by weighted sampling with replacements (using the person weights on the public use 
file). Data on voter registration status and turnout were matched to this frame using the November 
2010 Current Population Survey. Data on interest in politics and party identification were then 
matched to this frame from the 2007 Pew Religious Life Survey. The matched cases were weighted 
to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The matched cases and the frame were combined and 
a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in the frame. The propensity score function included 
age, gender, race/ethnicity, years of education, and ideology. The propensity scores were grouped 
into deciles of the estimated propensity score in the frame and post-stratified according to these 
deciles. 
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SI-4 Main Effects 
Tables SI-4.1 and SI-4.2 detail the bootstrap results discussed in Section 4.1. We calculated 
ordinal logistic regressions for APPROPRIATE and DEFERENCE and using these estimates, we 
calculated the difference in Pr(Agree) and Pr(Disagree) between treatments and the status quo 
(Consensus-Legislature) for the full and reduced samples (i.e., participants who answered all 
comprehension questions correctly by the second attempt). Table S1-4.1 and S1-4.2 are the results 
for USA and Germany, respectively. We calculated the confidence intervals of these differences 
using bootstrapping and use the normal distribution to estimate significance. The 5-ITEM model was 
estimated using OLS. After which, we calculated the difference in means between treatments and the 
status quo. We used bootstrapping to calculate the standard errors of this difference, and compared to 
the confidence intervals to a normal distribution.  
  APPROPRIATE DEFERENCE 5-ITEM 
  Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Mean 
Difference  
ConLeg-
MajAuto 
Full (-0.14, 0.05) (-0.02, 0.05) (-0.15, 0.03) (-0.01, 0.07) (-0.31, 0.06) 
Reduced (-0.13, 0.04) (-0.02, 0.05) (-0.14, 0.04) (-0.02, 0.07) (-0.31, 0.05) 
ConLeg-
MajLeg 
Full (-0.11, 0.07) (-0.01, 0.05) (-0.11, 0.03) (-0.02, 0.05) (-0.25, 0.11) 
Reduced (-0.11, 0.05) (-0.02, 0.05) (-0.11, 0.04) (-0.02, 0.06) (-0.23, 0.14) 
ConLeg- 
ConAuto 
Full (-0.05, 0.09) (-0.06, 0.02) (-0.08, 0.06) (-0.04, 0.04) (-0.11, 0.24) 
Reduced (-0.07, 0.09) (-0.06, 0.03) (-0.08, 0.08) (-0.06, 0.04) (-0.15, 0.24) 
Table SI-4.1: Bootstrap results for USA, 1000 replications, 95 percent confidence intervals compared to a normal 
distribution  
  APPROPRIATE DEFERENCE 5-ITEM 
  Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Mean 
Difference  
ConLeg-
MajAuto 
Full (-0.09, 0.04) (-0.01, 0.03) (-0.04, 0.09) (-0.02, 0.01) (-0.09, 0.14)   
Reduced (-0.09, 0.05) (-0.01, 0.03) (-0.03, 0.11) (-0.03, 0.01) (-0.08, 0.17) 
ConLeg-
MajLeg 
Full (-0.03, 0.07) (-0.02, 0.01) (-0.02, 0.09) (-0.02, 0.01) (-0.10, 0.12)   
Reduced (-0.02, 0.10) (-0.03, 0.01) (-0.01, 0.12) (-0.03, 0.00) (-0.06, 0.18) 
ConLeg- 
ConAuto 
Full (-0.12, 0.00) (-0.00, 0.04) (-0.08, 0.05) (-0.01, 0.02) (-0.16, 0.07) 
Reduced  (-0.13, 0.01) (-0.00, 0.04) (-0.09, 0.06) (-0.01, 0.02) (-0.16, 0.08) 
Table SI-4.2: Bootstrap results for Germany, 1000 replications, 95 percent confidence intervals compared to a normal 
distribution 
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Figure SI-4.1 United States Full Sample: The left side is the distributions of differences in the probability of agree with APPROPRIATENESS between Consensus-Legislature and Majority-Automatic. The right side is a QQplot comparing the standard errors to the quantiles of a normal distribution.  
Figure SI-4.2 Germany Full Sample: The left side is the distributions of differences in the probability of agree with APPROPRIATENESS between Consensus-Legislature and Majority-Automatic. The right side is a QQplot comparing the standard errors to the quantiles of a normal distribution.  
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SI-4 (a) Moderating Effects: Cognitive Mobilization  
  APPROPRIATE DEFERENCE 5-ITEM 
  Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Mean 
Difference  
ConLeg-
MajAuto 
Full (-0.59, 0.03) (-0.06, 0.21) (-0.70, -0.13) (0.002, 0.33) (-1.29, -0.07) 
Reduced (-0.62, 0.04) (-0.06, 0.25) (-0.70, -0.10) (0.03, 0.39) (-1.31, -0.03) 
ConLeg-
MajLeg 
Full (-0.31, 0.28) (-0.15, 0.16) (-0.37, 0.14) (-0.11, 0.26) (-0.82, 0.36) 
Reduced (-0.25, 0.31) (-0.22, 0.17) (-0.30, 0.16) (-0.14, 0.28) (-0.74, 0.50) 
ConLeg- 
ConAuto 
Full (-0.32, 0.29) (-0.16, 0.16) (-0.36, 0.19) (-0.14, 0.27) (-0.70, 0.46) 
Reduced (-0.31, 0.33) (-0.20, 0.21) (-0.26, 0.24) (-0.23, 0.27) (-0.66, 0.59) 
Table SI-4.1: Bootstrap results for participants who are extremely interested in international politics from the USA, 
1000 replications, 95 percent confidence intervals compared to a normal distribution  
  APPROPRIATE DEFERENCE 5-ITEM 
  Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Mean 
Difference  
ConLeg-
MajAuto 
Full (-0.21, 0.17) (-0.08, 0.09) (-0.16, 0.20)   (-0.10, 0.08) (-0.37, 0.50) 
Reduced (-0.21, 0.19) (-0.08, 0.09) (-0.16, 0.26) (-0.10, 0.08) (-0.27, 0.57) 
ConLeg-
MajLeg 
Full (-0.16, 0.21) (-0.11, 0.08) (-0.16, 0.21) (-0.11, 0.07) (-0.40, 0.48) 
Reduced (-0.15, 0.24) (-0.12, 0.08) (-0.15, 0.24) (-0.15, 0.06) (-0.35, 0.64) 
ConLeg- 
ConAuto 
Full (-0.11, 0.21) (-0.11, 0.05) (-0.15, 0.20) (-0.10, 0.07) (-0.23, 0.53)   
Reduced (-0.15, 0.24) (-0.12, 0.07) (-0.14, 0.29) (-0.16, 0.07) (-0.15, 0.70) 
Table SI-4.2: Bootstrap results for participants who are not at all interested in international politics from the USA, 1000 
replications, 95 percent confidence intervals compared to a normal distribution  
  APPROPRIATE DEFERENCE 5-ITEM 
  Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Mean 
Difference  
ConLeg-
MajAuto 
Full (-0.51, 0.05) (-0.03, 0.15) (-0.38, 0.19) (-0.05, 0.09) (-0.60, 0.44) 
Reduced (-0.53, 0.11) (-0.04, 0.16) (-0.42, 0.21) (-0.05, 0.09) (-0.69, 0.45) 
ConLeg-
MajLeg 
Full (-0.46, 0.12) (-0.04, 0.14) (-0.27, 0.25) (-0.06, 0.07) (-0.53, 0.45) 
Reduced (-0.48, 0.16) (-0.06, 0.15) (-0.21, 0.35) (-0.09, 0.05) (-0.47, 0.60) 
ConLeg- 
ConAuto 
Full (-0.30, 0.24) (-0.10, 0.12) (-0.45, 0.13) (-0.04, 0.10) (-0.52, 0.52) 
Reduced (-0.30, 0.34) (-0.13, 0.12) (-0.42, 0.20  (-0.05, 0.09) (-0.49, 0.54) 
Table SI-4.3: Bootstrap results for participants who are extremely interested in international politics from Germany, 
1000 replications, 95 percent confidence intervals compared to a normal distribution  
  APPROPRIATE DEFERENCE 5-ITEM 
  Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Mean 
Difference  
ConLeg-
MajAuto 
Full (-0.43, 0.48) (-0.24, 0.22) (-0.05, 0.78)  (-0.26, 0.10) (-0.23, 1.57) 
Reduced (-0.41, 0.57) (-0.25, 0.22) (-0.12, 0.77) (-0.22, 0.13) (-0.26, 1.66) 
ConLeg-
MajLeg 
Full (-0.58, 0.31) (-0.15, 0.22) (-0.22, 0.54) (-0.13, 0.07) (-0.53, 0.45) 
Reduced (-0.64, 0.33) (-0.13, 0.19) (-0.17, 0.57) (-0.12, 0.06) (-0.47, 0.60) 
ConLeg- 
ConAuto 
Full (-0.38, 0.46) (-0.24, 0.21) (-0.43, 0.36) (-0.08, 0.09) (-0.60, 1.15) 
Reduced (-0.42, 0.57) (-0.24, 0.21) (-0.36, 0.33) (-0.06, 0.07) (-0.59, 1.26) 
Table SI-4.4: Bootstrap results for participants who are not at all interested in international politics from Germany, 
1000 replications, 95 percent confidence intervals compared to a normal distribution  
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SI – 4 (b) Alternative measures of cognitively mobilization: Education  
Education is a frequently used as a measure of cognitive mobilization. The German and 
American education systems differ substantially. Therefore, YouGov uses different questions in each 
country. For the American sample, we used: What is the highest level of education you have 
completed? (Did not graduate from high school, High school graduate, Some college, but no degree 
(yet), 2-year college degree, 4-year college degree, Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, 
etc.)) . For the German sample, we used: When did you stop schooling? (15 or younger, 16, 17-18, 
19, 20 or older, still studying, I can’t remember).  
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 APPROPRIATE DEFERENCE 5-ITEM 
 Full Reduced Full Reduced Full Reduced 
Majority 0.09 
(0.21) 
0.11 
(0.23) 
-0.01 
(0.20) 
0.07 
(0.22) 
0.06  
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.14) 
Automatic -0.44 * 
(0.20) 
-0.37 
(0.23) 
-0.47 * 
(0.20) 
-0.38 
(0.23) 
-0.26 * 
(0.12) 
-0.19 
(0.14) 
No high school -0.34 
(0.43) 
-0.53 
(0.48) 
-0.17 
(0.44) 
-0.29 
(0.49) 
-0.15  
(0.12) 
-0.15 
(0.31) 
Some college (no 
degree) 
0.02 
(0.25) 
0.06 
(0.28) 
-0.17 
(0.25) 
-0.06 
(0.28) 
-0.07 
(0.26) 
0.00 
(0.17) 
2-year college -0.05 
(0.33) 
0.07 
(0.39) 
-0.20 
(0.33) 
-0.13 
(0.38) 
-0.07 
(0.14) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
4-year college 0.30 
(0.26) 
0.29 
(0.30) 
-0.03 
(0.26) 
0.02 
(0.29) 
0.20 
(0.19) 
0.22 
(0.17) 
Postgraduate 0.32 
(0.38) 
0.29 
(0.42) 
-0.25 
(0.36) 
-0.05 
(0.40) 
0.08 
(0.15) 
0.11 
(0.24) 
Majority*Auto 0.50 
(0.29) 
0.28 
(0.32) 
0.46 
(0.29) 
0.28 
(0.32) 
0.22 
(0.21) 
0.05 
(0.19) 
No high 
school*Majority 
1.33 
(0.70) 
1.25 
(0.79) 
0.49 
(0.66) 
0.71 
(0.78) 
0.37 
(0.39) 
0.41 
(0.47) 
Some college (no 
degree) *Majority 
-0.15 
(0.35) 
-0.33 
(0.39) 
0.08  
(0.35) 
-0.21 
(0.39) 
0.02 
(0.20) 
-0.16 
(0.23) 
2-year college*Majority 0.15 
(0.47) 
0.00 
(0.55) 
0.24 
(0.47) 
0.10 
(0.53) 
0.07 
(0.27) 
-0.08 
(0.31) 
4-year college*Majority -0.02 
(0.38) 
-0.08 
(0.42) 
0.32 
(0.38) 
0.09 
(0.42) 
-0.02 
(0.22) 
-0.08 
(0.31) 
Postgraduate*Majority -0.17 
(0.51) 
-0.51 
(0.56) 
0.24 
(0.49) 
-0.18 
(0.55) 
-0.05 
(0.28) 
-0.09 
(0.25) 
No high 
school*Automatic 
0.64 
(0.62) 
0.81 
(0.69) 
0.76 
(0.64) 
0.76 
(0.71) 
0.33 
(0.37) 
0.22 
(0.32) 
Some college (no 
degree) *Automatic 
0.72 * 
(0.35) 
0.73 
(0.40) 
0.88 * 
(0.35) 
0.85 * 
(0.40) 
0.54 * 
(0.20) 
0.24 * 
(0.43) 
2-year college 
*Automatic 
0.83 
(0.50) 
0.67 
(0.57) 
0.78 
(0.50) 
0.53 
(0.56) 
0.41 
(0.29) 
0.51 
(0.23) 
4-year 
college*Automatic 
0.25 
(0.39) 
0.09 
(0.43) 
0.39 
(0.38) 
0.16 
(0.42) 
0.11 
(0.22) 
-0.02 
(0.25) 
Postgraduate*Automatic 0.42 
(0.50) 
0.35 
(0.55) 
1.24 * 
(0.49) 
0.85 
(0.54) 
0.44 
(0.28) 
0.30 
(0.33) 
No high 
school*Maj*Auto 
-1.47 
(0.92) 
-0.90 
(1.06) 
-0.95 
(0.90) 
-0.60 
(1.05) 
-0.39 
(0.53) 
0.00 
(0.63) 
Some college (no 
degree) *Maj*Auto 
-0.19 
(0.50) 
-0.12 
(0.57) 
-0.43 
(0.50) 
-0.36 
(0.56) 
-0.20 
(0.29) 
-0.07 
(0.33) 
2-year 
college*Maj*Auto 
-1.16 
(0.69) 
-0.60 
(0.80) 
-1.12 
(0.68) 
-0.74 
(0.77) 
-0.54 
(0.39) 
-0.22 
(0.46) 
4-year 
college*Maj*Auto 
-0.83 
(0.55) 
-0.28 
(0.61) 
-0.81 
(0.55) 
-0.29 
(0.61) 
-0.35 
(0.31) 
0.00 
(0.36) 
Postgraduate*Maj*Auto -0.31 
(0.69) 
0.11 
(0.75) 
-1.09 
(0.68) 
-0.47 
(0.75) 
-0.29 
(0.38) 
0.02 
(0.43) 
N 1600 1270 1600 1270 1600 1600 
Link logit logit logit logit   
AIC 3945.24 3173.38 4026.18 3225.72 4757.114 3845.425 
Table SI -4.5 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. We use an ordinal logistic regression to calculate the interaction 
effects between education and treatments variables on APPROPRIATE and DEFERENCE. The coefficients cannot be 
interpreted directly. We use an OLS to calculate the results for the 5-ITEM variable. This is why there is a link function 
for APPROPRIATE and DEFERENCE and not for the 5-ITEM.  
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SI-4 (c) Moderating Effects: Climate Concern  
  APPROPRIATE DEFERENCE 5-ITEM 
  Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Mean 
Difference  
ConLeg-
MajAuto 
Full (-0.08, 0.11) (0.00, 0.00) (-0.13, 0.08) (-0.00, 0.01) (-0.25, 0.12) 
Reduced (-0.09, 0.09) (0.00, 0.00) (-0.13, 0.09) (0.00, 0.01) (-0.29, 0.10) 
ConLeg-
MajLeg 
Full (-0.15, 0.03) (0.00, 0.01) (-0.17, 0.04) (0.00, 0.01) (-0.35, 0.03) 
Reduced (-0.13, 0.04) (0.00, 0.00) (-0.16, 0.06) (0.00, 0.01) (-0.34, 0.07) 
ConLeg- 
ConAuto 
Full (-0.08, 0.11) (0.00, 0.00) (-0.13, 0.08) (0.00, 0.01) (-0.15, 0.21) 
Reduced (-0.09, 0.09) (0.00, 0.00) (-0.13, 0.09) (0.00, 0.00) (-0.15, 0.21) 
Table SI-4.6: Bootstrap results for participants who are extremely concerned about climate change (12) from the USA, 
1000 replications, 95 percent confidence intervals compared to a normal distribution  
 
  APPROPRIATE DEFERENCE 5-ITEM 
  Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Mean 
Difference  
ConLeg-
MajAuto 
Full (0.00, 0.01) (-0.23, 0.14) (-0.01, 0.01) (-0.28, 0.04) (-0.25, 0.32) 
Reduced (0.00, 0.01) (-0.18, 0.18) (0.00, 0.01) (-0.30, 0.01) (-0.24, 0.24) 
ConLeg-
MajLeg 
Full (0.00, 0.01) (-0.30, 0.02) (0.00, 0.01) (-0.23, 0.06) (-0.13, 0.36) 
Reduced (0.00, 0.01) (-0.28, 0.01) (0.00, 0.01) (-0.24, 0.05) (-0.09, 0.31) 
ConLeg- 
ConAuto 
Full (0.00, 0.01) (-0.26, 0.06) (0.00, 0.01) (-0.20, 0.10) (-0.13, 0.31) 
Reduced (0.00, 0.01) (-0.22, 0.08) (0.00, 0.01) (-0.22, 0.09) (-0.17, 0.21) 
Table SI-4.7: Bootstrap results for participants who are not at all concerned about climate change (3) from the USA, 
1000 replications, 95 percent confidence intervals compared to a normal distribution  
 
  APPROPRIATE DEFERENCE 5-ITEM 
  Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Mean 
Difference  
ConLeg-
MajAuto 
Full (-0.14, 0.01) (0.00, 0.01) (-0.12, 0.08) (0.00, 0.01) (-0.32, 0.03) 
Reduced (-0.19, 0.08) (0.00, 0.01) (-0.15, 0.06) (0.00, 0.01) (-0.38, -0.01) 
ConLeg-
MajLeg 
Full (-0.05, 0.19) (-0.01, 0.00) (0.05, 0.18) (0.00, 0.01) (-0.12, 0.24) 
Reduced (-0.05, 0.22) (-0.01, 0.00) (-0.06, 0.18) (0.00, 0.00) (-0.13, 0.25) 
ConLeg- 
ConAuto 
Full (-0.14, 0.10) (-0.01, 0.01) (-0.12, 0.08) (0.00, 0.01) (-0.21, 0.14) 
Reduced (-0.19, 0.08) (0.00, 0.01) (-0.15, 0.06) (0.00, 0.00) (-0.27, 0.08) 
Table SI-4.8: Bootstrap results for participants who are extremely concerned about climate change (12) from Germany, 
1000 replications, 95 percent confidence intervals compared to a normal distribution  
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  APPROPRIATE DEFERENCE 5-ITEM 
  Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Difference 
Pr(Agree)  
Difference 
Pr(Disagree) 
Mean 
Difference  
ConLeg-
MajAuto 
Full (-0.11, 0.10) (-0.59, 0.09) (-0.14, 0.17) (-0.86, -0.18) (0.18, 1.45) 
Reduced (-0.06, 0.07) (-0.61, 0.15) (-0.13, 0.18) (-0.99, -0.20) (0.14, 1.56) 
ConLeg-
MajLeg 
Full (-0.07, 0.04) (-0.19, 0.65) (-0.11, 0.12) (-0.50, 0.35) (-0.12, 0.23) 
Reduced (-0.07, 0.05) (-0.23, 0.69) (-0.16, 0.20) (-0.58, 0.34) (-0.13, 0.25) 
ConLeg- 
ConAuto 
Full (-0.11, 0.10) (-0.20, 0.69) (-0.14, 0.17) (-0.53, 0.40) (-0.79, 0.87) 
Reduced (-0.06, 0.07) (-0.51, 0.52) (-0.13 0.11) (-0.83, 0.18) (-0.41, 1.19) 
Table SI-4.9: Bootstrap results for participants who are not at all concerned about climate change (3) from Germany, 
1000 replications, 95 percent confidence intervals compared to a normal distribution  
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SI-5 (a) Interaction of Authority and Perceived Authority  
 
 Appropriateness Deference 5-ITEM 
 Full Reduced Full Reduced Full Reduced 
Majority 0.13 
(0.76) 
 
0.245 
(0.83) 
-0.95 
(0.75) 
-0.96 
(0.83) 
-0.09 
(0.35) 
-0.11 
(0.38) 
Automatic 0.78 
(0.65) 
 
0.87 
(0.67) 
0.10 
(0.68) 
-0.07 
(0.71) 
0.10 
(0.31) 
0.08 
(0.32) 
USA -0.36 
(0.606) 
 
-0.62    
(0.68) 
-1.77** 
(0.62) 
-2.03**    
(0.70) 
-0.77 ** 
(0.29) 
-0.87**    
(0.31) 
Too little control 1.626** 
(0.52) 
 
1.50  ** 
(0.55) 
0.71 
(0.55) 
0.73 
(0.59) 
0.48 
(0.26) 
0.43 
(0.26) 
Sufficient control  1.56 ** 
(0.52) 
 
1.52  ** 
(0.54) 
0.85 
(0.55) 
0.88 
(0.58) 
0.52* 
(0.25) 
0.49 
(0.26) 
Too much control  1.23 * 
(0.54) 
 
1.22* 
(0.57) 
1.08 
(0.58) 
1.17 
0.61) 
0.56* 
0.26) 
0.56   * 
(0.27) 
Maj*Automatic -0.44 
(0.96) 
 
-0.82    
(1.04) 
0.26 
(0.96) 
0.45 
(1.05) 
-0.03 
(0.44) 
-0.02 
(0.47) 
Maj*USA 0.68 
(0.90) 
 
0.45 
(1.00) 
1.60 
(0.89) 
1.74 
(1.00) 
0.56 
(0.41) 
0.54 
(0.45) 
Auto*USA -0.82 
(0.80) 
 
-0.47 
(0.88) 
0.09 
(0.82) 
0.79 
(0.91) 
-0.01 
(0.37) 
0.22 
(0.40) 
Maj*Too little  -0.17 
(0.79) 
 
-0.34    
(0.86) 
1.02 
(0.78) 
0.91 
(0.87) 
0.13 
(0.37) 
0.12 
(0.40) 
Maj*Sufficient -0.26 
(0.79) 
 
-0.45    
(0.86) 
0.63 
(0.78) 
0.61 
(0.86) 
-0.01 
(0.37) 
0.00 
(0.39) 
Maj*Too much 0.51 
(0.82) 
 
0.25 
(0.89) 
1.29 
(0.83) 
1.16 
(0.91) 
0.21 
(0.38) 
0.18 
(0.41) 
Auto*Too little -0.91 
(0.68) 
 
-0.95    
(0.71) 
-0.05 
(0.72) 
0.07 
(0.76) 
-0.13 
(0.32) 
-0.11 
(0.34) 
Auto*Sufficient -0.31 
(0.68) 
 
-0.48 
(0.70) 
0.19 
(0.71) 
0.30 
(0.75) 
0.04 
(0.32) 
0.05 
(0.33) 
Auto*Too much -0.46 
(0.80) 
 
-0.75 
(0.85) 
-0.6 
(0.85) 
-0.54 
(0.91) 
-0.26 
(0.38) 
-0.24 
(0.40) 
USA*Too little -0.62 
(0.65) 
 
-0.58    
(0.74) 
0.23 
(0.67) 
0.11 
(0.75) 
0.12 
(0.31) 
0.08 
(0.34) 
USA*Sufficient 0.52 
(0.63) 
0.73 
(0.71) 
1.30* 
(0.65) 
1.49* 
(0.73) 
0.62* 
(0.30) 
0.70* 
(0.33) 
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USA*Too much 1.01 
(0.68) 
 
1.26 
(0.75) 
1.21 
(0.70) 
1.33 
(0.77) 
0.59 
(0.32) 
0.67 
(0.34) 
Maj*Auto*USA -0.33 
(1.15) 
 
-0.03782    
(1.27) 
-1.19 
(1.14) 
-1.91 
(1.28) 
-0.41 
(0.52) 
-0.53    
(0.57) 
Maj * Auto * 
Too little 
0.74 
(1.01) 
 
1.27 
(1.09) 
-0.34 
(1.00) 
-0.36 
(1.10) 
0.04 
(0.46) 
0.11 
(0.50) 
Maj * Auto * 
Sufficient  
0.21 
(1.00) 
 
0.63 
(1.08) 
-0.20 
(1.00) 
-0.36 
(1.09) 
0.03 
(0.46) 
0.02 
(0.49) 
Maj * Auto * 
Too much 
-2.25 
(1.21) 
 
-1.07 
(1.34) 
-2.33 
(1.24) 
-1.68 
(1.41) 
-1.00 
(0.56) 
-0.75 
(0.62 
Auto*Too little * 
USA 
0.52 
(0.87) 
 
0.19 
(0.97) 
-0.43 
(0.89 
-1.06 
(0.99 
-0.19 
(0.41) 
-0.40    
(0.44) 
Auto*Sufficient* 
USA 
0.47 
(0.84) 
 
0.43 
(0.93) 
-0.17 
(0.86) 
-0.77 
(0.95) 
-0.04 
(0.39) 
-0.18 
(0.43) 
Auto*Too much 
* USA 
0.45 
(0.98) 
 
0.45 
(1.09) 
0.59 
(1.02 
0.27 
(1.13 
0.24 
(0.46) 
0.11 
(0.50) 
Maj*Too little * 
USA 
-1.03 
(0.97) 
 
-0.69    
(1.08) 
-1.89*   
(0.96) 
-1.80 
(1.08) 
-0.80 
(0.45) 
-0.68 
(0.49) 
Maj*Sufficient* 
USA 
-0.15 
(0.94) 
 
0.18 
(1.04) 
-0.96 
(0.93) 
-1.06 
(1.04) 
-0.28 
(0.43) 
-0.27    
(0.47) 
Maj*Too much * 
USA 
-1.35 
(1.00) 
 
-0.95 
(1.11) 
-1.92    
(1.02) 
-1.82 
(1.12) 
-0.65 
(0.46) 
-0.55 
(0.50) 
Maj*Auto*USA* 
Too little 
1.13 
(1.25) 
 
0.62 
(1.39) 
2.08 
(1.25) 
2.51 
(1.40) 
0.87 
(0.57) 
0.90 
(0.63) 
Maj*Auto*USA* 
Sufficient 
0.69 
(1.21) 
 
0.37 
(1.34) 
1.19 
(1.21) 
2.04 
(1.35) 
0.46 
(0.55) 
0.65 
(0.60) 
Maj*Auto*USA* 
Too much 
2.18 
(1.47) 
0.59 
(1.68) 
2.02 
(1.49) 
1.35 
(1.73) 
0.96 
(0.67) 
0.56 
(0.75) 
N 3196 2622 3196 2622 3196 2622 
Link Logit Logit Logit Logit   
AIC 7283.77 5954.92 6893.77 5551.18 8175.985 6686.323 
Table SI-5.1:  *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. We use an ordinal logistic regression to calculate the results for 
APPROPRIATENESS and DEFERENCE. We use an OLS to calculate results for 5-ITEM. Reduced samples are the 
participants who answered all three comprehension questions correctly by their second attempt.  
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SI-5 (b) Interaction between Authority and Political Ideology  
 
We interacted political ideology with the treatments. YouGov uses different questions for political 
ideology in Germany and the US. Therefore, we ran the analyses separately. Table SI-5.2 lists results 
for Germany and Table SI-5.3 for the US.  
 
Germany: In political matters, people talk of " left" and "right". How would you place your 
views on this scale? (1-Left to 10-Right)  
 
United States: In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint? (Very 
liberal, Liberal, Moderate, Conservative, Very conservative, Not sure) 
 
 Appropriateness Deference 5-ITEM 
 Full Reduced Full Reduced Full Reduced 
Majority 0.08 
(0.44) 
0.05 
(0.48) 
-0.07 
(0.46) 
-0.12 
(0.51) 
-0.07 
(0.13) 
-0.16 
(0.13) 
Auto 
 
0.41 
(0.44) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.52 
(0.47) 
0.47 
(0.51) 
0.08 
(0.18) 
0.06 
(0.19) 
Left_Right -0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.12 
(0.06) 
-0.13 
(0.07) 
-0.06 * 
(0.17) 
-0.07* 
(0.18) 
Maj*Auto 0.45 
(0.63) 
0.11 
(0.69) 
-0.24 
(0.66) 
-0.47 
(0.73) 
0.11 
(0.02) 
0.10 
(0.03) 
Auto*Left_Right -0.02 
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.08 
(0.09) 
-0.09 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.25) 
-0.01 
(0.27) 
Maj*Left_Right 0.00 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
Maj*Auto*Left_Right -0.14 
(0.12) 
-0.05 
(0.13) 
0.02 
(0.13) 
0.10 
(0.14) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
N 1600 1354 1600 1354 1600 1354 
Link Logit Logit Logit Logit   
AIC 3481.08 2981.65 3040.91 2553.84 3607.593 3044.65 
Table SI-5.2:  *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Results for Germany: We use an ordinal logistic regression to 
calculate the results for APPROPRIATENESS and DEFERENCE. We use an OLS to calculate results for 5-ITEM. 
Reduced samples are the participants who answered all three comprehension questions correctly by their second attempt.  
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 Appropriateness Deference 5-ITEM 
 Full Reduced Full Reduced Full Reduced 
Majority 0.21 
(0.47) 
0.31 
(0.41) 
0.26 
(0.45) 
0.38 
(0.40) 
0.10 
(0.20) 
0.20 
(0.15) 
Auto -0.09 
(0.48) 
-0.13 
(0.42) 
0.33 
(0.47) 
0.26 
(0.41) 
0.17 
(0.21) 
0.17 
(0.21) 
Left_Right -0.86*** 
(0.10) 
-0.52*** 
(0.08) 
-0.77*** 
(0.10) 
-0.45*** 
(0.08) 
-0.44*** 
(0.05) 
-0.29*** 
(0.04) 
Maj*Auto -0.07 
(0.66) 
0.03 
(0.59) 
-0.22 
(0.64) 
-0.06 
(0.58) 
-0.14 
(0.28) 
-0.13 
(0.29) 
Auto*Left_Right -0.06 
(0.15) 
0.03 
(0.12) 
-0.14 
(0.14) 
-0.07 
(0.12) 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
Maj*Left_Right -0.09 
(0.14) 
-0.09 
(0.12) 
-0.08 
(0.14) 
-0.10 
(0.12) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
Maj*Auto*Left_Right 0.14 
(0.20) 
0.06 
(0.17) 
0.12 
(0.20) 
0.05 
(0.17) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
N 1461 1270 1461 1270  1461 1270 
Link Logit Logit Logit Logit   
AIC 3263.37 2933.29 3362.18 3010.13 3979.95 3585.55 
Table SI-5.3:  *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Results for US: We use an ordinal logistic regression to calculate 
the results for APPROPRIATENESS and DEFERENCE. We use an OLS to calculate results for 5-ITEM. Reduced 
samples are the participants who answered all three comprehension questions correctly by their second attempt.  
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SI-6 Other factors influencing legitimacy perceptions 
 
 Undemocratic 
(Full) 
Undemocratic 
(Reduced) 
Pressure 
(Full) 
Pressure 
(Reduced) 
Ineffective 
(Full) 
Ineffective 
(Reduced) 
Majority -0.08 
(0.14) 
-0.07 
(0.14) 
-0.06 
(0.13) 
-0.03 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(0.13) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
Automatic 0.14 
(0.14) 
0.13 
(0.15) 
-0.04 
(0.13) 
-0.06 
(0.14) 
-0.14 
(0.14) 
-0.15 
(0.14) 
USA 0.26 
(0.15) 
0.09 
(0.15) 
0.80 *** 
(0.14) 
0.73 *** 
(0.14) 
-0.13 
(0.14) 
 
-0.24 
(0.15) 
Majority*Automatic -0.07 
(0.20) 
-0.05 
(0.21) 
0.11 
(0.19) 
0.10 
(0.20) 
0.003 
(0.19) 
0.03 
(0.20) 
Majority*USA -0.09 
(0.21) 
0.05 
(0.22) 
-0.16 
(0.20) 
-0.10 
(0.20) 
0.16 
(0.20) 
0.18 
(0.21) 
Automatic*USA -0.15 
(0.21) 
-0.02 
(0.22) 
0.09 
(0.20) 
 
0.14 
(0.21) 
 
0.02 
(0.20) 
0.18 
(0.22) 
Majority*Automatic 
*USA 
-0.16 
(0.29) 
-0.36 
(0.32) 
-0.47 
(0.28) 
 
-0.46 
(0.30) 
-0.32 
(0.28) 
-0.40 
(0.30) 
 
N 2463 2189 2765 2446 2693 2383 
Link logit logit logit logit logit logit 
AIC 6565.49 5729.68 7460.60 6565.53 6889.42 6033.41 
Table SI-6.1:  *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. We use an ordinal logistic regression to calculate the results. 
Undemocratic, Pressure, and Ineffective are ordinal variables with response categories: agree, somewhat agree, 
somewhat disagree, and disagree.  
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SI-7 Survey Questions  
 
United States Germany 
Please read the following statement carefully. If you choose to participate in 
this survey, please click on the button next to "I have read and understood 
the consent form and agree to participate in this survey." If you choose not to 
participate, please click on the "Cancel" button at the bottom of this page. 
  
This survey is carried out for a research project led by Professor Thomas 
Bernauer from ETH Zürich. Its objective is to better understand personal 
opinions concerning international politics. This survey is for scientific 
purposes only. It has no commercial or government-related purpose. There 
are no known risks or costs when participating in the survey. The 
information you provide will help us understand opinions concerning 
international politics. This survey is anonymous. The information you 
provide in this survey will not be stored or used in any way that could 
reveal your personal identity. 
  
If you have any questions or concerns about completing the questionnaire or 
about participating in this survey, you may contact us at 
thbesurveyone@gess.ethz.ch or write to Thomas Bernauer, ETH Zürich, 
Haldeneggsteig 4, 8092 Zürich, Switzerland. The ETH Zürich Ethics Review 
Commission has reviewed and approved this project. If you have any 
concerns about your rights in this survey, please contact us at 
thbesurveyone@gess.ethz.ch or Raffael Iturrizaga from the ETH Zürich 
Ethics Review Commission at raffael.iturrizaga@sl.ethz.ch or +41 44 632 
2354 with reference to its decision EK 2012-N-41. 
  
(1) I have read and understood the consent form and agree to participate in 
the survey 
(2) Cancel 
Bitte lesen Sie die folgende Erklärung sorgfältig durch.Wenn Sie an dieser 
Umfrage teilnehmen möchten, wählen Sie bitte die Option „Ich habe die 
Erklärung gelesen und verstanden und willige ein, an der Umfrage 
teilzunehmen.“ Wenn Sie nicht an dieser Umfrage teilnehmen möchten, 
wählen Sie bitte die Option „Abbrechen“. 
  
Diese Umfrage ist Teil eines Forschungsprojekts der ETH Zürich, das von 
Professor Thomas Bernauer geleitet wird. Ziel der Umfrage ist ein besseres 
Verständnis über persönliche Meinungen zur internationalen Politik. Ihre 
Angaben werden ausschließlich für wissenschaftliche Zwecke ausgewertet. 
Die Teilnahme an der Umfrage ist freiwillig und birgt keine bekannten 
Risiken oder Kosten. Die von Ihnen zur Verfügung gestellten Informationen 
werden anonymisiert ausgewertet und gespeichert, sodass keine 
Rückschlüsse auf Ihre Person möglich sind. 
  
Wenn Sie Fragen oder Anliegen zum Fragebogen oder zur Teilnahme an 
dieser Umfrage haben, können Sie den Projektleiter per E-Mail 
(thbesurveyone@gess.ethz.ch) oder auf dem Postweg (Thomas Bernauer, 
ETH Zürich, Haldeneggsteig 4, 8092 Zürich, Schweiz) kontaktieren. Die 
Ethikkommission der ETH Zürich hat dieses Forschungsprojekt überprüft 
und genehmigt. Bei Fragen zu diesem Punkt können Sie sich an Raffael 
Iturrizaga von der Ethikkommission der ETH Zürich unter 
raffael.iturrizaga@ethz.ch oder unter +41 44 632 2354 mit Verweis auf den 
Beschluss EK 2012-N-41 wenden. 
(1) Ich habe die Erklärung gelesen und verstanden und willige ein, an der 
Umfrage teilzunehmen 
(2) Abbrechen 
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 Welcome to the survey. Our research will only produce meaningful results if 
you read and think about each question carefully and express your true 
opinion. Thank you for keeping this in mind! We anticipate that the survey 
will take you no longer than 15 minutes to complete. Please take your time. 
We greatly appreciate your contribution. Lastly, please avoid using the 'Back' 
button of your browser during the Survey.  
  
  
Willkommen zu dieser Umfrage. Unsere Studie kann nur dann 
aussagekräftige Ergebnisse hervorbringen, wenn Sie jede Frage aufmerksam 
lesen, darüber nachdenken und Ihre tatsächliche Meinung wiedergeben. 
Vielen Dank, dass Sie dies berücksichtigen! Wir gehen davon aus, dass die 
Umfrage Sie nicht länger als 15 Minuten in Anspruch nehmen wird. Bitte 
lassen Sie sich Zeit. Wir schätzen Ihre Mitwirkung sehr. Bitte verwenden Sie 
während der Umfrage nicht die ´Zurück´-Taste Ihres Internetbrowsers. 
  
Explanation of Climate Change 
We burn large amounts of coal, oil and gas when producing energy and in 
transportation. When we burn these fossil fuels, we emit carbon dioxide 
(CO2) into the atmosphere. Growing amounts of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the 
atmosphere cause the global temperature to rise. This is commonly referred 
to as climate change or global warming. To prevent further temperature 
increases, governments from around the world are meeting to design a 
worldwide strategy.  
  
Wir verbrennen große Mengen an Kohle, Öl und Gas bei der 
Energieproduktion und im Transportwesen. Bei der Verbrennung dieser 
fossilen Energieträger stoßen wir Kohlendioxid (CO2) in die Erdatmosphäre 
aus. Zunehmende Mengen an CO2 in der Erdatmosphäre verursachen 
steigende Temperaturen weltweit. Dies wird gemeinhin als Klimawandel 
oder globale Erderwärmung bezeichnet. Um weitere Temperaturanstiege zu 
verhindern, treffen sich Regierungen aus aller Welt um globale Maßnahmen 
auszuarbeiten. 
Description of Global Climate Conference 
  
Specifically, governments meet annually at the Global Climate Conference, 
which includes 190 countries along with the United States. Their aim is 
to negotiate an international agreement to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions worldwide. This meeting is also known as the Conference of the 
Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
  
Negotiations at the Global Climate Conference focus on two issues: 
• How much should worldwide carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions be reduced? 
• How much should each country reduce its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
to achieve the worldwide goal?  
  
  
Konkret treffen sich die Regierungen jährlich zur Weltklimakonferenz, an 
der insgesamt 190 Staaten teilnehmen, inklusive Deutschland. Ihr Ziel ist 
es, ein internationales Ankommen zur weltweiten Reduktion der 
Emissionen von Kohlendioxid (CO2) auszuhandeln. Dieses Treffen ist 
auch bekannt als Konferenz der Vertragsparteien des Rahmenabkommens 
über Klimaveränderungen. 
  
Verhandlungen an der Weltklimakonferenz konzentrieren sich auf zwei 
Fragestellungen: 
• Um wie viel soll der weltweite Kohlendioxidausstoß (CO2) insgesamt 
reduziert werden? 
• Um wie viel soll jedes einzelne Land seinen Kohlendioxidausstoß (CO2) 
reduzieren, um das weltweite Gesamtziel zu erreichen? 
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Comprehension Check 
If question below answered incorrectly, redirect to previous page. After which, participants continue regardless. 
  
According to what you read on the previous page, the Global Climate 
Conference's purpose is to: 
  
• Reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
• Prevent melting of the ice in the Arctic 
• Prevent the extinction of endangered species 
• Don't know  
  
  
  
Gemäß den Informationen, die Sie auf der vorherigen Seite gelesen haben, ist 
das Ziel der Weltklimakonferenz: 
  
• Den Ausstoß von Kohlendioxid (CO2) zu verringern 
• Das Schmelzen des Arktischen Eises zu verhindern 
• Das Aussterben von bedrohten Arten zu verhindern 
• Ich weiß nicht 
International Voting Treatment 
Randomly assign participants to either majority or consensus voting 
Majority 
At the meeting, countries negotiate their positions and draft a proposed 
agreement. Once countries complete these negotiations, they will vote for or 
against a proposed agreement. As mentioned before, the proposed agreement 
focuses on two issues:  
• How much should worldwide carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions be reduced? 
• How much should each country reduce its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
to achieve the worldwide goal? 
•   
The voting rule is as follows: 
  
• If more than half of the participating countries (the majority) vote in 
favor of the proposed agreement, then the proposed agreement will pass 
and negotiations will end even if the United States voted against. 
• If more than half of the participating countries vote against the 
proposed agreement, then the proposed agreement will not pass even if the 
United States voted in favor. In that case, there is no agreement and countries 
Auf der Weltklimakonferenz verhandeln die Staaten ihre Positionen und 
formulieren einen Entwurf für ein internationales Abkommen zur Reduktion 
der weltweiten Emissionen von Kohlendioxid. Sobald die Staaten ihre 
Verhandlungen über ein solches Abkommen abgeschlossen haben, findet 
eine Abstimmung über den ausgehandelten Entwurf statt. Jeder Staat kann 
dann für oder gegen den Entwurf des Abkommens stimmen. Wie bereits 
erwähnt, konzentriert sich das vorgesehene Abkommen auf zwei Punkte:  
• Um wie viel soll der weltweite Kohlendioxidausstoß (CO2) insgesamt 
reduziert werden? 
• Um wie viel soll jedes einzelne Land seine Emissionen von Kohlendioxid 
(CO2) reduzieren, um das weltweite Gesamtziel zu erreichen? 
  
Die Abstimmungsregel lautet wie folgt: 
  
• Wenn mehr als die Hälfte der teilnehmenden Staaten (die Mehrheit) für 
den Entwurf des Abkommens stimmt, dann gilt der Entwurf als 
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will resume negotiations next year. 
  
beschlossen und die Verhandlungen sind beendet. Das Abkommen kann also 
auch dann zustande kommen, wenn Deutschland dagegen stimmt. 
• Wenn mehr als die Hälfte der teilnehmenden Länder gegen den 
Entwurf des Abkommens stimmt, dann gilt der Entwurf als abgelehnt. In 
diesem Fall kommt kein Abkommen zustande und die Staaten werden ihre 
Verhandlungen im nächsten Jahr wiederaufnehmen. Das Abkommen kann 
also auch dann abgelehnt werden und nicht zustande kommen, wenn 
Deutschland dafür stimmt. 
  
Consensus 
At the meeting, countries negotiate their positions and draft a proposed 
agreement. Once countries complete these negotiations, they will vote for or 
against a proposed agreement. As mentioned before, the proposed agreement 
focuses on two issues:  
• How much should worldwide carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions be reduced? 
• How much should each country reduce its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
to achieve the worldwide goal? 
•   
The voting rule is the following: 
• If all participating countries (unanimity) vote in favor of the proposed 
agreement, then the proposed agreement will pass and negotiations will end 
as long as the United States also votes in favor. 
• If any participating country votes against the proposed agreement, then 
the proposed agreement will not pass even ifthe United States voted in favor. 
In that case, there is no agreement and countries will resume negotiations 
next year. 
  
 Auf der Weltklimakonferenz verhandeln die Staaten ihre Positionen und 
formulieren einen Entwurf für ein internationales Abkommen zur Reduktion 
der weltweiten Emissionen von Kohlendioxid. Sobald die Staaten ihre 
Verhandlungen über ein solches Abkommen abgeschlossen haben, findet 
eine Abstimmung über den ausgehandelten Entwurf statt. Jeder Staat kann 
dann für oder gegen den Entwurf des Abkommens stimmen. Wie bereits 
erwähnt, konzentriert sich das vorgesehene Abkommen auf zwei Punkte:  
• Um wie viel soll der weltweite Kohlendioxidausstoß (CO2) insgesamt 
reduziert werden? 
• Um wie viel soll jedes einzelne Land seine Emissionen von Kohlendioxid 
(CO2) reduzieren, um das weltweite Gesamtziel zu erreichen? 
Die Abstimmungsregel lautet wie folgt: 
• Wenn alle teilnehmenden Staaten einstimmig für den Entwurf des 
Abkommen stimmen, dann gilt der Entwurf als beschlossen und die 
Verhandlungen sind beendet. Das Abkommen kann also nur dann zustande 
kommen, wenn auch Deutschland dafür stimmt. 
• Wenn irgendeiner der teilnehmenden Staaten gegen den Entwurf des 
Abkommen stimmt, dann gilt der Entwurf als abgelehnt. In diesem Fall 
kommt kein Abkommen zustande und die Staaten werden ihre 
Verhandlungen im nächsten Jahr wiederaufnehmen. Das Abkommen kann 
also auch dann abgelehnt werden und nicht zustande kommen, wenn 
Deutschland dafür stimmt.  
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Comprehension Check: International Voting 
If question below answered incorrectly, redirect to previous page. After which, participants continue regardless. 
  
According to what you just read on the previous page, a proposed agreement 
will pass: 
• If the majority of countries votes in favor even if the United States votes 
against 
• Only if all countries, including the United States, vote in favor 
• Don't know 
  
  
  
  
Gemäß den Informationen, welche Sie auf der vorherigen Seite gelesen 
haben, gilt der Entwurf für ein Abkommen als beschlossen: 
• Sobald die Mehrheit der Staaten zustimmt, selbst wenn Deutschland 
dagegen stimmt 
• Sobald alle Staaten, einschließlich Deutschland, dafür stimmen 
• Ich weiß nicht 
 
  
  
Domestic Ratification Treatment 
Randomly assign participants to either automatic implementation or approval by legislature 
Automatic Implementation 
Once international negotiations end and if an agreement passes, the 
agreement needs to be implemented within participating countries (at the 
domestic level). Imagine that all countries participating in the Global 
Climate Conference, including the United States, decided before the 
negotiations to automatically implement an agreement if one is passed. 
This means that if the Conference passes an agreement, the United States 
must reduce its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by the amount specified in 
that agreement. However, if the Conference does not pass an agreement, the 
United States has no obligation to reduce its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. 
  
 Sobald die internationalen Verhandlungen beendet sind und ein 
Vertragsentwurf nach der gültigen Abstimmungsregel angenommen worden 
ist, muss dieses Abkommen im nächsten Schritt von den einzelnen Staaten 
auf der nationalen Ebene umgesetzt werden. Stellen Sie sich vor, dass vor 
den internationalen Verhandlungen alle Staaten, die an der 
Weltklimakonferenz teilnehmen – einschließlich Deutschland – Folgendes 
beschlossen haben: Alle teilnehmenden Staaten der Weltklimakonferenz 
müssenautomatisch einen im Rahmen der Verhandlungen 
angenommenen Vertragsentwurf umsetzen. Das bedeutet, dass 
Deutschland den eigenen Ausstoß von Kohledioxid (CO2) um die im 
Abkommen festgelegte Menge verringern muss. Sollte an der 
Weltklimakonferenz jedoch kein Abkommen zustande kommen, so hat 
Deutschland keine Verpflichtung, den eigenen Ausstoß von Kohlendioxid 
(CO2) zu verringern.  
  
Legislature 
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Once international negotiations end and if an agreement passes, the 
agreement needs to be implemented within participating countries (at the 
domestic level). Imagine that all countries participating in the Global 
Climate Conference, including the United States, decided before the 
negotiations to implement an agreement reached by the Conference only 
after their respective parliament/legislature back home has approved 
the agreement as well. This means that if Congress approves the agreement, 
the United States must reduce its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by the 
amount specified in that agreement. However, if Congress does not approve 
the agreement, the United States has no obligation to reduce its carbon (CO2) 
emissions. 
Sobald die internationalen Verhandlungen beendet sind und ein Entwurf für 
ein Abkommen nach der gültigen Abstimmungsregel angenommen worden 
ist, muss dieses Abkommen im nächsten Schritt von den einzelnen Staaten 
auf der nationalen Ebene umgesetzt werden. Stellen Sie sich vor, dass alle an 
der Weltklimakonferenz teilnehmenden Staaten, einschließlich Deutschland, 
vor den Verhandlungen vereinbart haben, dass ein im Rahmen der 
Verhandlungen angenommener Entwurf für das Abkommen nur dann 
innerhalb der teilnehmenden Staaten umgesetzt werden muss, wenn die 
jeweiligen nationalen Parlamente das Abkommen genehmigen. Das bedeutet, 
dass Deutschland den eigenen Ausstoß von Kohledioxid (CO2) um die im 
Abkommen festgelegte Menge nur dann verringern muss, wenn der 
Bundestag und Bundesrat dem Abkommen zustimmt. Sollte der Bundestag 
und Bundesrat dem Abkommen jedoch nicht zustimmen, so hat Deutschland 
keine Verpflichtung, den eigenen Ausstoß von Kohlendioxid (CO2) zu 
verringern. 
Comprehension Check: Domestic Ratification 
If question below answered incorrectly, redirect to previous page. After which, participants continue regardless. 
  
According to what you read on the previous page, once the Climate 
Conference reaches an agreement, the United States: 
  
• Must implement the agreement only if the Environmental Protection 
Agency approves the agreement 
• Must implement the agreement only if Congress approves the agreement 
• Must automatically implement the agreement 
• Don't know 
  
  
  
  
Gemäß der Informationen, die Sie auf der vorherigen Seite gelesen haben. 
Sobald bei der Weltklimakonferenz ein Entwurf für ein Abkommen zustande 
gekommen ist, muss Deutschland: 
• Das Abkommen nur dann umsetzen, wenn das Bundesumweltministerium 
das Abkommen genehmigt 
• Das Abkommen nur dann umsetzen, wenn der Bundestag und der Bundesrat 
dem Abkommen zustimmen 
• Das Abkommen automatisch umsetzen 
• Ich weiß nicht  
  
Show Corresponding Flow Chart of Global Climate Conference Procedure 
We would like to know your opinion about the Global Climate Conference 
as it was described a moment ago. 
Wir interessieren uns für Ihre Meinung zur Weltklimakonferenz, wie sie auf 
den vorherigen Seiten beschrieben wurde, und möchten Ihnen dazu ein paar 
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  Fragen stellen. 
  
5-ITEM Legitimacy Measure 
Randomize the order of the items and the direction of the scale between participants 
Please state the extent to which you agree, somewhat agree, somewhat 
disagree or disagree with the following statements: 
• I believe the Global Climate Conference is necessary. 
• The principles of the Global Climate Conference match my own. 
• I sympathize with the goals of the Global Climate Conference. 
• I think the Global Climate Conference serves an important role in society. 
• The Global Climate Conference should continue to make decisions in the 
future. 
Bitte geben Sie an, ob Sie den folgenden Aussagen zustimmen, eher 
zustimmen, sie eher ablehnen oder ablehnen: 
• Ich glaube, dass die Weltklimakonferenz notwendig ist. 
• Die Werte der Weltklimakonferenz stimmen mit meinen eigenen Werten 
überein. 
• Ich teile die Ziele der Weltklimakonferenz. 
• Ich denke, dass die Weltklimakonferenz eine wichtige Rolle in der 
Gesellschaft spielt. 
• Die Weltklimakonferenz sollte auch in der Zukunft Entscheidungen treffen. 
  
Fairness Measure 
I believe that this way of deciding how much countries, including the United 
States, must reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions is the right way to find a 
solution to the climate change problem. 
 
• Disagree 
• Somewhat disagree 
• Somewhat agree 
• Agree 
  
  
  
Bitte sagen Sie uns ob Sie der folgenden Aussage zustimmen oder diese 
ablehnen: Der beschriebene Prozess legt fest, um wie viel die beteiligten 
Staaten, darunter auch Deutschland, ihren Ausstoß von Kohlendioxid 
reduzieren müssen (CO2). Dies ist der richtige Weg zur Lösung des 
Klimawandelproblems. 
  
• Lehne ab 
• Lehne eher ab 
• Stimme eher zu 
• Stimme zu  
  
Manipulation Check 
Did participants perceive the varying levels of authority? 
Do you think this process from the previous pages describing whether and 
how much the United States must reduce its carbon dioxide emissions gives 
the United States too little or too much control over this policy? 
Denken Sie nochmals an den Abstimmungs- und Umsetzungsprozess bei der 
Weltklimakonferenz und auf der nationalen Ebene, so wie dieser auf den 
vorherigen Seiten beschrieben wurde. Finden Sie, dass dieser Prozess 
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• No control 
• Too little control 
• Sufficient control 
• Too much control 
  
Deutschland zu wenig oder zu viel Kontrolle darüber gibt, ob und wie viel es 
seinen Ausstoß von Kohlendioxid (CO2) verringert? 
• Keine Kontrolle 
• Zu wenig Kontrolle 
• Genügend Kontrolle 
• Zu viel Kontrolle 
Climate Change Concern 
Randomize the order of questions and the direction of response categories between participants 
 When do you think global climate change will harm people? 
  
• It will never harm people 
• It will not harm people for many years 
• It will harm people in the next few years 
• It is harming people around the world now 
  
  
 Glauben Sie, dass der Klimawandel den Menschen bereits heute weltweit 
schadet, den Menschen erst in den nächsten paar Jahren weltweit schaden 
wird, den Menschen für viele Jahre nicht schaden wird, oder den Menschen 
nie schaden wird? 
  
• Den Menschen nie schaden wird 
• Den Menschen für viele Jahre nicht schaden wird 
• Den Menschen erst in den nächsten paar Jahren weltweit schaden wird 
• Der Klimawandel den Menschen bereits heute weltweit schadet  
  
 In your view, how serious of a problem is global climate change? 
  
• Not a problem 
• Not too serious 
• Somewhat serious 
• Very serious 
  
  
Ist Ihrer Ansicht nach der Klimawandel ein sehr ernstes Problem, relativ 
ernstes Problem, nicht zu ernstes Problem oder gar kein Problem? 
  
• Gar kein Problem 
• Nicht zu ernstes 
• Relativ ernstes 
• Sehr ernstes 
  
  
How concerned are you, if at all, that global climate change will harm you 
personally at some point in your lifetime? 
  
• Very concerned 
• Somewhat concerned 
Wie besorgt sind Sie, falls überhaupt, dass der Klimawandel Ihnen persönlich 
im Verlauf Ihres Lebens schaden wird? Sind Sie sehr besorgt, etwas besorgt, 
nicht zu besorgt, oder gar nicht besorgt? 
  
• Sehr besorgt 
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• Not too concerned 
• Not at all concerned 
  
  
• Etwas besorgt 
• Nicht zu besorgt 
• Gar nicht besorgt 
  
  
Interest in international politics 
  
How interested are you in international politics? 
  
• Extremely interested  
• Very interested  
• Somewhat interested  
• Not at all interested• 
  
  
  
Wie interessiert sind Sie an internationaler Politik? 
  
• Überhaupt nicht interessiert  
• Etwas interessiert 
 • Sehr interessiert  
• Extrem interessiert  
  
Self-Described Understanding of Treatments 
  
Now that you have read the description at the beginning of the survey, how 
well do you understand what the Global Climate Conference is and how it 
works? 
  
• Not at all  
• A bit 
 • To some extent  
• Well  
• Very well 
  
  
  
  
Nach dem Lesen und Beantworten dieser Umfrage, wie gut verstehen Sie aus 
Ihrer Sicht, was auf der Weltklimakonferenz passiert und wie diese 
funktioniert? 
  
• Verstehe sehr gut  
• Verstehe ziemlich gut  
• Verstehe einigermassen 
• Verstehe überhaupt nicht 
  
  
Mechanisms 
Please tell us whether you agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or disagree with the following statement. Order randomized participants 
It does not matter how negotiations are conducted and what the voting rules Die Weltklimakonferenz ist zu wirkungslos, um den Klimawandel zu 
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are, the Global Climate Conference is too ineffective to stop climate change. 
  
  
stoppen, egal wie die Verhandlungen durchgeführt werden und wie die 
Abstimmungs- und Umsetzungsregeln lauten. 
  
No country should be pressured into reducing its carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions if it does not want to. 
  
  
Kein Land sollte unter Druck gesetzt werden, seinen Kohlendioxidausstoß zu 
reduzieren, wenn es dazu nicht bereit ist. 
The Global Climate Conference creates strong pressure on the United States 
to act against climate change. 
  
  
Die Weltklimakonferenz setzt Deutschland unter starken Druck, etwas gegen 
den Klimawandel zu tun. 
  
  
An international body, in which many countries are involved, should not be 
allowed to tell the United States what to do. 
  
  
Einer internationalen Konferenz, an der viele andere Staaten beteiligt sind, 
sollte nicht gestattet sein, Deutschland vorzuschreiben, was es tun muss. 
  
  
The climate change problem can only be solved if the Global Climate 
Conference has the authority to decide how much each country must reduce 
its carbon dioxide emissions even if it’s against the will of the United States. 
  
  
Das Problem des Klimawandels kann nur gelöst werden, wenn die 
Weltklimakonferenz frei entscheiden kann, wie viel Kohlendioxidausstoß 
jeder Staat reduzieren muss, wenn nötig auch gegen den Willen 
Deutschlands. 
  
  
The Global Climate Conference is undemocratic. 
  
  
Die Weltklimakonferenz ist undemokratisch. 
YouGov Demographic Questions 
In what year were you born? 
  
  
In what year were you born? 
  
  
Are you male or female? 
  
 Bitte geben Sie Ihr Geschlecht an. ( männlich/weiblich)  
  
Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income? Wie hoch war das durchschnittliche Monatseinkommen Ihres Haushalts vor 
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• Less than $10,000  
• $10,000 - $19,999  
• $20,000 - $29,999  
• $30,000 - $39,999  
• $40,000 - $49,999  
• $50,000 - $59,999  
• $60,000 - $69,999  
• $70,000 - $79,999  
• $80,000 - $99,999  
• $100,000 - $119,999  
• $120,000 - $149,999  
• $150,000 or more  
• Prefer not to say 
Steuern in den vergangenen 12 Monaten? Bitte zählen Sie hierzu Einkünfte 
aus Lohn, Gehalt, selbständiger Tätigkeit, Rente, Pension, jeweils ohne 
Abzug der Steuern und Sozialversicherungsbeiträge. Rechnen Sie bitte auch 
die Einkünfte aus öffentlichen Beihilfen, Einkommen aus Vermietung, 
Verpachtung, Wohngeld, Kindergeld und sonstige Einkünfte hinzu. 
  
• Weniger als 750 Euro  
• 750 bis unter 1.250 Euro 
• 1.250 bis unter 1.750 Euro 
• 1.750 bis unter 2.250 Euro  
• 2.250 bis unter 2.750 Euro  
• 2.750 bis unter 3.250 Euro  
• 3.250 bis unter 3.750 Euro  
• 3.750 bis unter 4.250 Euro  
• 4.250 bis unter 4.750 Euro  
• 4.750 bis unter 5.250 Euro  
• 5.250 bis unter 5.750 Euro  
• 5.750 bis unter 6.250 Euro 
• 6.250 Euro und meh 
  
In which state do you live? 
  
 In welchem Bundesland leben Sie? 
  
In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint? 
  
• Very liberal  
• Liberal  
• Moderate  
• Conservative  
• Very conservative  
• Not sure 
 
In der Politik spricht man von "links" und "rechts". Wie würden Sie 
persönlich Ihren politischen Standpunkt auf dieser Liste einordnen? (1 to 10)  
  
What racial or ethnic group best describes you?   
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• White  
• Black or African-American  
• Hispanic or Latino  
• Asian or Asian-American  
• Native American  
• Middle Eastern  
• Mixed Race  
• Other (please specify)  
  
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
  
• Did not graduate from high school  
• High school graduate  
• Some college, but no degree (yet)  
• 2-year college degree  
• 4-year college degree  
• Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc.) 
  
  
 Welchen höchsten Schulabschluss haben Sie? 
• Noch in schulischer Ausbildung 
• Haupt-(Volks-)schulabschluss  
• Realschul- oder gleichwertiger Abschluss (POS, Mittlere Reife) 
• Abitur, Fachhochschulreife 
• Ohne Schulabschluss 
• keine Angabe 
 
Welchen höchsten Bildungsabschluss haben Sie? 
• Keinen Abschluss 
• Noch in Ausbildung 
• Noch im Studium 
• Lehre oder vergleichbarer Abschluss 
• Universitäts- oder Fachhochschulabschluss  
• keine Angabe 
 
Wann haben stoppen Sie Ihre Ausbildung? 
• 15 oder jünger  
• 16  
• 17-18   
• 19   
• 20 oder älter  
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• Studiere noch  
• Kann mich nicht erinnern 
  
What is your marital status? 
  
• Married, living with spouse  
• Separated  
• Divorced  
• Widowed 
• Single, never married  
• Domestic partnership 
  
  
Are you the parent or guardian of any children under the age of 18? (Yes/No) 
  
  
  
Which of the following best describes your current employment status? 
  
• Working full time now  
• Working part time now  
• Temporarily laid off  
• Unemployed  
• Retired  
• Permanently disabled  
• Taking care of home or family  
• Student  
• Other (please specify)  
  
  
  
  
 Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...? 
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• Democrat  
• Republican  
• Independent  
• Other (please specify)   
• Not sure 
  
  
Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public 
affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others 
aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in 
government and public affairs ... 
  
• Most of the time  
• Some of the time  
• Only now and then  
• Hardly at all  
• Don't know 
  
  
  
Would you describe yourself as a "born-again" or evangelical Christian, or 
not? 
  
  
  
How important is religion in your life?  
• Very important  
• Somewhat important 
• Not too important  
• Not at all important  
  
  
What is your present religion, if any? 
  
• Protestant  
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• Roman Catholic  
• Mormon  
• Eastern or Greek Orthodox  
• Jewish 
  
• Muslim  
• Buddhist  
• Hindu  
• Atheist 
• Agnostic  
• Nothing in particular  
• Something else (please specify)  
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SI 8: Robustness checks 
 Insignificant treatment effects could be problematic because of possible false negatives (type II error). Hence, we engage in several robustness checks. One potential concern could be the complexity of the issue to which survey participants are exposed. Under such conditions, insignificant results might stem from participants’ inability to understand the context, the treatments, and the dependent variable items. In the worst case, this could result in participants providing socially desirable answers to our legitimacy items irrespective of treatment conditions. The combination of “noisy” treatments and ceiling effects due to social desirability bias on dependent variable items would then result in insignificant treatment effects. We are able to refute this potential concern by estimating all models with samples excluding respondents who incorrectly answered one or more of the comprehension questions by their second attempt. The results remain the same for the direct effects. For the moderating effects, we find the same significant interaction between treatments and cognitive mobilization. Those who are more cognitively mobilized in the US sample perceive Majority-Automatic as more legitimate than Consensus-Legislature in the reduced sample. For the moderating effect of climate concern, we find similar results, specifically, no significant interaction effect between authority and climate concern on legitimacy beliefs.  Moreover, one might argue that answering a comprehension check question correctly by the second attempt could be luck and not truly reflect actual understanding of the treatment. To assess this possibility, we conducted analyses on the sample of participants who answered the three comprehension questions correctly by their second attempt and whose self-reported understanding to the question, Now that you have read the description at the beginning of the 
survey, how well do you understand what the Global Climate Conference is and how it works, was either well or very well.  For the analyses of the main effects and moderating effects for those who are extremely interested we obtain the same results. The results of these robustness checks support the conclusion that our results are unlikely to be artifacts of participants’ incomprehension of the policy context or the treatments. Moreover, the results for the manipulation check demonstrate that the treatments were effective in the sense of treated participants being aware of shifted authority, and in the sense of, their country losing at least some control over the policymaking process.    Another potential concern might be that our dependent variables fail to accurately measure legitimacy perceptions. The existing literature tends to use trust and confidence, which, as noted earlier, are necessary conditions for legitimacy but not sufficient. Moreover, relying on individual survey items, rather than scales consisting of several items, increases the risk of measurement error. Therefore, we carried out analyses with the 5-ITEM dependent variable in order to capture different facets of legitimacy. In addition, the 5-ITEM measure is not skewed towards high perceived legitimacy levels, unlike APPROPRIATE and DEFERENCE, making ceiling effects unlikely. The results remained unchanged when using the 5-ITEM measure. Given the robustness of the results using the two single-item measures and the composite dependent variable, our findings are quite robust.   To assess the robustness of the observed effect of authority level on perceived legitimacy amongst more cognitively mobilized individuals in the US, we use another measure of cognitive mobilization. We conducted ordinal logistic regressions for the full and reduced samples, with APPROPRIATE and DEFERENCE as well as the 5-ITEM measure as dependent variables. The results indicate that those with a high school education in the full US sample find 
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the climate governance framework with legislature approval more legitimate than automatic implementation. Likewise, those with some college find automatic implementation more legitimate than legislature approval. Overall, these results confirm the findings reported further above (see SI-4 (b)).  The evidence from the core part of our survey experiment shows that the mass public is able to understand the implications of pooling authority internationally. However, shifting authority does not seem to significantly affect citizen’s legitimacy perceptions with respect to the climate governance framework.    
